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Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity
Through Procurement Contracts
A B S TR A CT. Voting machine failures continue to plague American elections. These failures
have fueled the growing sense that private machine manufacturers must be held accountable.
This Note argues that, because legitimacy externalities and resource disparities across election
jurisdictions pose persistent threats to electoral integrity, meaningful accountability will require
greater federal oversight. This oversight must take into account the unique nature of the publicprivate partnership that defines this nation's system of election administration. This Note thus
proposes an amendment to the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which would condition federal
funds on state procurement contracts. These procurement contracts would mandate
performance-based requirements for vendors to supply the means with which to verify votes
cast. Such contracts should not only have third-party beneficiary enforcement mechanisms, but
also override the doctrine of trade secrecy invoked by manufacturers to prevent software
disclosure.
A U T HO R. Yale Law School, J.D. 2oo8; Oxford University, M.Phil. 2004; Yale College, B.A.
2002. I am grateful to Michael Kang, Anne O'Hagen Karl, Nicholas Parrillo, Richard Posner,
Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Dan Tokaji for their thoughtful comments. Special thanks to
Heather Gerken for inspiration and to Jerry Mashaw for his many insights.
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INTRODUCTION

For democracy to be done, it must be seen to be done.' Political legitimacy
springs not only from how the state acts, but also from how those actions are
publicly perceived. Nowhere is this insight more crucial than in election law
and administration, where casting a ballot can mark the start of a saga. Perhaps
now more than ever, Americans leave the polls wondering whether their votes
were counted- and for the right candidate. But if the media spectacle of Bush v.
Gore2 was this nation's wake-up call, the latest round of elections did little to
allay those fears. Newspaper headlines relayed stories of disappearing ballots
and malfunctioning machines.' Battleground states had more than their fair
share of woes,4 though larger margins of victory in 20o8 have dampened the
real and perceived consequences. With soaring rates of voter turnout,' voters'

1.

This observation modifies the well-known refrain that for "justice to be done, it must be
seen to be done." See, e.g., Amnesty International, Justice Must Be Seen To Be Done,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE23/o1o/2oo4/evdomMDE23olo2oo4en.pdf (Aug. 2004) (criticizing Saudi Arabia's denial of independent
observers to verify the fairness of criminal trials as "denying themselves the opportunity to
show how they are advancing human rights").

2.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).

3.

See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Big Turnout Means Linesfor Voters Across City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2008, at P15 ("Probably the greatest problem cited by voters was breakdown of voting
machines in several precincts."); Greg Gordon, Glitches Mar Voting but Apparently Don't
Tarnish

4.

5.

Outcome,

MCCLATCHY

NEWSPAPERS,

Nov.

4,

2008,

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/146/story/553o4.html (reporting on "[w]aits of up to seven
hours, voting machine failures and registration glitches"); Christian M. Wade, Voting
Vendor
May
Be
Ousted,
TAMPA
TLIB.
(Fla.),
Nov.
8,
2008,
http://www2.tbo.conf/content/2oo8/nov/o8/o8oo13/na-voting-vendor-may-be-ousted/
("Memory cards on each of the [county's] voting machines became overloaded and the data
couldn't be transferred to machines tabulating the totals.").
See, e.g., Ben Conery, Three Swing States See Machine Problems, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008,
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2oo8/nov/o5/three-swing-states-see-machineproblems/ ("Reports of long lines at the polls, malfunctioning voting machines and ballot
shortages came from several states Tuesday morning as the 2008 elections kicked off,
including problems in the battleground states of Virginia, Florida and Pennsylvania.");
Carol J. Williams & Noam N. Levey, Voting Problems Look Isolated, L.A. TiMEs, Nov. 5, 2008,
http ://www.latimes.coni/news/printedition/asection/la-na-votingproblemss2oo8novo5,o,547993o.story (reporting that voting machine "glitches [we]re most
pronounced in battleground states").
See Kathleen Burge, As in '04, Voter Turnout Was High, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 20o8,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2oo8/ii/o9/as-in-04-voter-turnout was-high
(observing that "national voter turnout soared"); Clarence Page, Jackson's Eloquent Tears,
CHI. TRB., Nov. 9, 2008, at 40 (describing "reports that Obama increased voter turnout
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experiences with and the growing media attention to voting machine glitches
have cast a pall on Election Day, throwing into question the results of political
contests nationwide. 6 The need for accountability abounds.
Central to this growing sense of unease is the role that for-profit companies
play in the provision of our electoral infrastructure. One famous flashpoint
occurred in 2003 when Walden O'Dell-then-chief executive of Diebold
Election Systems, a voting machine manufacturer -sent out a fundraising
letter on behalf of George W. Bush, promising that he was "committed to
helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year."7 Few need to
be reminded of Ohio's pivotal role in the ensuing race to know why O'Dell's
remarks raised hackles. 8 Consider still the revelation following Chuck Hagel's
surprising Senate race win in 1996, called by some the "major Republican
upset in the November election."9 Until two weeks before he announced his
candidacy, Chuck Hagel had been chairman of American Information Systems,
now known as Election Systems & Software.' This company was the same one
that supplied many of the very voting machines used to count his election's
votes." While there has been little, if any, evidence of actual tampering or
undue influence, the perception of impropriety is undeniable.12

since 2004 among self-identified Republicans (up 3 percent), moderates (up 6 percent) and
conservatives (up 5percent)").
6.

See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, Tension Escalates as Recount Fluctuates, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),

7.

Nov. 8, 20o8, at Al (reporting that voting machine time-stamp problems are calling into
doubt Senate race's vote tallies); Greg Grisolano, County Discovers Problem in Voting:
Machine ErrorCould Affect Racefor County Attorney, JOPLIN GLOBE (Mo.), Nov. 7, 2008, at IA
(describing how a "programming error in the voting machines at one Crawford County
polling place could swing the outcome of the county attorney's race").
Ian Urbina, Voting Officials Face New Rules To Bar Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at Ai;
Paul R. LaMonica,

8.

The Trouble with E-voting, CNNMoNEY.coM,

Aug.

30,

2004,

http ://money.cnn.com/2oo4/o8/3o/technology/election-diebold/.
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,and the
Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1220 (2005) (describing Ohio as "a
pivotal swing state in the 2004 election" and "the state on which the outcome of the
presidency turned").

9. Myra MacPherson, Brothers in Arms, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1997, at Di.
1o.

See ELLIOT D. COHEN & BRUCE W. FRASER, THE LAST DAYS OF DEMOCRACY 277 (2007);
http://hagel.senate.gov/public/
Hagel,
Chuck
States
Senator
United
index.cfm?FuseAction=Biography.Home (last visited Dec. 5,2008) (noting that Senator
Hagel served as Chairman of the Board of American Information Systems).

11. See JAMES MOORE, BUSH'S WAR FOR REELECTION 304 (2004) ("Senator Hagel was an owner
of the company that produced the machines that counted 85 percent of the votes in elections
he won...."); Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman, Diebold's Political Machine,
http://www.motherjones.con/commentary/
Mar.
s,
2004,
MOTHERIONES.COM,
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These episodes reflect America's public-private partnership of election
administration: a publicly funded system for the private provision of
governmental services. 13 This hybrid regime features thousands of
decentralized bureaucracies and a select group of private vendors that produce
the equipment and requisite software to count millions of ballots. 14 An
increasing demand for vote-counting goods and services has only augmented
the private sector's role. With butterfly ballots still fresh in voters' minds, for
example, many counties switched from paper-based ballot systems to Direct
Record Electronic (DRE) systems -stand-alone machines that record votes in
their internal memories." In 2006, more Americans than ever used electronic
voting machines to cast their ballots, accounting for millions of dollars in
revenue. 6 Georgia, as well as several other states, employed DRE touch screens
in every precinct. 7 Though some states like California have recently decertified
their DREs due to security concerns, 8 major problems with paper ballots in

columns/2oo4/03/03_200.html ("[M]achines made by [American Information Systems]
probably tallied 8s percent of the votes cast in the 1996 vote ...").
12.

See MOORE, supra note ii, at 305 (noting in the context of the controversy surrounding

13.

Senator Hagel that "[t]here are several perceived political apparent conflicts of interest
among the companies producing electronic voting machines").
See Stephen H. Linder & Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Mapping the Terrain of the PublicPrivate Policy Partnership,in PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 1(Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau

14.

ed., 2000).
See CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS, WHAT COULD BE 48, 53
(2001), http:// vote.caltech.edu/drupaVfiles/repor/votingwhat-is whatcouldbe.pdf.

15.

See

BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: VOTING SYSTEM
SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY, USABILITY, AND COST 3 (2006) (describing various types of DRE
machines); ERIC A. FISCHER, VOTING TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2001); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and
Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1738 (2005) ("DREs are [] stand-alone

machines that record votes in their internal memories."). The most recent models include
ATM-style touch screens, in which voters touch the screen to cast their votes. See HENRY E.
BRADY ET AL., COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY IN

13 (2001). Others feature "voter-verifiable paper trails," which allow
voters to contemporaneously confirm that their vote was accurately memorialized on paper.
Though responsible for only 12.2% of the total vote in 2000, the figure more than doubled
by 2004 to nearly 30%, making it the second most popular method behind optical scan.
16. See Michael J. de la Merced, Maker of Voting Machines Receives a Takeover Offer, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2008, at A14 (noting that Diebold earned $61 million in revenue in 2007 and $195
million in 2006).
17.
See Tod Newcombe, Putting the "E" in Elections, GOV'T TECH., Dec. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.print.php?id=364o8.
18. Press Release, Cal. Sec'y of State, Secretary of State Debra Bowen Moves To Strengthen
Voter Confidence in Election Security Following Top-to-Bottom Review of Voting Systems
THE UNITED STATES
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recent primaries suggest that many jurisdictions will revisit their technological
options. 9 These jurisdictions will then turn to private vendors as both
consultants and suppliers, further reinforcing the necessarily symbiotic
relationship between public and private interests in election administration.
Private companies will thus continue to play a pivotal role in the core
democratic task of administering elections. While election administration has
never been performed solely by government,2" the need for technological
innovation coupled with recent outlays in federal funding guarantee that
private actors will be entrusted with central electoral functions. This prospect
demands the recasting of familiar debates over privatization and the kinds of
institutions that will ensure accountability. 1 The confluence of private interests
and technological development also raises novel legal issues surrounding the
ownership of intellectual property marshaled for inherently public purposes.
All the while, the need for election integrity -and the perception of integrity remains paramount.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I critically examines threats to voter
confidence resulting from disputed election results and voting machine
failures. Breakdowns in technology or simple incompetence in one locality can
impose legitimacy externalities on others. That is, questionable electoral
outcomes in one election can cast grave doubts upon the results of another,
even in the absence of formal challenges. These Election Day snafus serve only
to exacerbate striking resource disparities in election administration across
localities arising from wealth inequalities and competing budgetary priorities.2
Poorer counties, for example, tend to have more antiquated voting equipment
while affluent ones can afford more modern technologies, which yield lower

(Aug.
3, 2007),
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voing-systems/
ttbr/dbo 7 _o42_ttbr.system decisions release.pdf.
19. See Ted Rowlands, Paper Ballots Could Delay California Results, CNN.coM, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://www.cnn.coff/2oo8/POLITICS/o2/o4/california.ballots/.
2o. See ROY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF
INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 178 (2006).
21.

See Jack M. Beermann, Privatizationand PoliticalAccountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507
(2001); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:Accountingfor the New Religion, 116
HARv. L. REv. 1229, 126o (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci,
PrivatizationandAccountability, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1422 (2003).

22.

See Paul S. Herrnson, Improving Election Technology and Administration: Toward a Larger
FederalRole in Elections?, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 151-52 (2002) ("[The] most prevalent
explanation for the lack of uniformity [in election standards] is the unequal distribution of
wealth across counties.").
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rates of vote invalidation.23 A lack of centralized coordination has also resulted

in diverging election standards and ballot design, with little sense of shared
best practices.'

Taken together, these interjurisdictional threats to voter

confidence make plain the need for greater federal intervention in election
administration.
Given this need for a more robust federal role, Part II considers America's
existing mix of what I will call accountability tools-the institutional means
through which actors force others to account for their actions and praise or
blame them accordingly. These tools provide both ex ante incentives to
structure parties' relationships as well as meaningful mechanisms to enforce
these relationships ex post. They can take many forms, including market
transactions, regulatory mandates, or familiar legal sanctions such as criminal
punishment or civil damages. In the context of voting reform, the most
prominent federal effort to restructure electoral institutions has been the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).25 The Help America Vote Act was
Congress's first real effort to replace outdated vote-counting technology and
spur voluntary national standards for voting machinery. A combination of
short-sightedness and timidity, however, prompted states and localities to
quickly purchase and invest in expensive voting equipment. Consequently,
HAVA's one-time payouts have succeeded only in cutting short the
development of a secondary market and concomitant avenues for competition.
A major challenge for future election reform, then, is to develop vigorous
market incentives for innovation safeguarded by greater public inspection and
transparency. Legitimate elections demand mechanisms that can ensure robust
oversight without stifling advances in voting technology and security. Part III
thus conceptually develops a largely overlooked device in the election
accountability toolkit: the institutional design of procurement contracts.
Procurement contracts differ from traditional commercial contracts insofar as
they combine competition and bargaining with an independent body of norms

23.

24.

25.

For example, poorer voters in Fulton County, Georgia, cast their ballots on more antiquated
punch-card voting machines, while more affluent residents in Georgia's Cobb and Gwinnett
counties vote on more modern optical-scan machines. Those voting in Fulton County were
10.4 times more likely to have their vote invalidated than those voting in Cobb and
Gwinnett County. Id. at 152; see also Leslie Wayne, The 2000 Election: The Voting System:
Close Vote Illuminates Hodgepodge of Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A24 ("With
county budgets for elections often given a low priority, local election officials often lack
money to buy modern voting equipment .... ").
See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 1 ("Counties make decisions about ballot
design and instruction language without performing usability testing to avoid voter
confusion and mistake.").
42 U.S.C. §5 15,301-15,545 (Supp. V. 2005).
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emphasizing transparency and fairness.26 Longer-term contracts can also help
tie the hands of successive election officials well past their party's stint in
power. This would help create incentives for officials to purchase equipment
that best serves the public interest, rather than short-sighted partisan aims.
Furthermore, procurement contracts can also limit the remedies available to
private contractors in the event of government breach as well as impose unique
requirements justified by distinct public needs." While contracts may seem
worrisome in their ability to obscure traditional lines of responsibility, this Part
will argue that well-designed contracts signal not a retreat of government
oversight, but rather a reconfiguration much needed in election administration.
Armed with these insights, Part IV then proposes two related reforms using
procurement contracts to hold both private manufacturers and election officials
accountable. First, it suggests that the Help America Vote Act be amended to
mandate, as a condition of federal funding, that state procurement contracts
include a performance provision requiring bidders to provide the technology
and access with which to verify votes cast. When mandatory contractual
provisions are performance based, they can encourage the market to supply
accountability-enhancing options such as open-source technology or voterverified paper trails. This Part will also explore the reasons why procurement
contracts will likely result in more innovation and resource flexibility relative to
legislative bargains struck in Congress. Second, current (and proposed) HAVA
provisions should be enforced through the explicit designation of candidates as
third-party beneficiaries to voting machine procurement contracts. Allowing
candidates to sue state election officials and private manufacturers for specific
performance to disclose underlying source code and to verify election results
would not only provide a meaningful sanction, but also increase the public
legitimacy of the American election system as a whole.
I.

THE FEDERAL IMPERATIVE

That states and localities continue to administer federal elections with
minimal congressional regulation is largely the product of path-dependence
and simple indifference. But the electoral landscape is changing, and so, too, is

26.

The American Bar Association, for example, has promulgated a model procurement code for
state and local governments with explicitly designated purposes that include "increas[ing]
public confidence in the procedures followed in public procurement" and "ensur[ing] the
fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system of this
[State]." MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOV'TS

§ 1-1ol(2)(d)-(e)

(2000).
27.

See Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 155, 165 (2000).
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the need for greater uniformity and jurisdictional equality. This Part argues
that Congress has both the power and the urgent mandate to provide baseline
standards for election administration. This nation's Founders explicitly
anticipated the need for federal intervention in election administration and
enshrined it in constitutional text.2s The Elections Clause provides that state
legislatures should have the power to prescribe "Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," but that Congress should
nonetheless be allowed to "make or alter such Regulations."2 To the drafters,
federal oversight was still necessary as a check against state legislatures that
abused their powers, particularly given that the same equipment and
infrastructure were usually used in both state and federal contests.3" While
states would be given considerable leeway in their election practices, Congress
would maintain the power to safeguard the integrity of the ballot box.
A. Legitimacy Externalities
The federal government's traditional reluctance to legislate in the electoral
arena, however, has been a major cause of our figurative and literal hanging
chads. 31 Although Congress has tepidly exercised its constitutional grant over
the years, 3 recent doubts about the validity of elections have highlighted what
is at stake in failing to critically reexamine the status quo. Palm Beach County's
dimpled butterfly ballots in 2000, for instance, "brought with [them] a fierce
light of public scrutiny [that] uncovered election administration's family

28.

In addition to the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I, other constitutional sources
for the congressional regulation of elections include the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1,5; the Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; and the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. i, § 8, cl. 3. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz,
CongressionalAuthority To Regulate Elections, in THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF ELECTIONS 14,

(Kenneth Gross et al. eds., 2001).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Among the areas in which Congress might wish to regulate,
according to Madison, was "whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce."
SALTMAN, supra note 20, at 45 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 240-41 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
30. See Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 28, at 16 ("Although as a formal matter the Elections Clause
gives Congress power only to regulate elections for the House and Senate, states may find it
easier and cheaper simply to standardize to the federally mandated congressional model for
all the elections-presidential, state, or local- they conduct.").
31. See SALTMAN, supra note 20, at 185 (arguing that "failed federalism fueled the Florida fiasco"
(emphasis omitted)).
17-21

29.

32.

See infra Section

II.B.
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secret: the tottering and decrepit nature of U.S. voting technology."33
Suddenly, voters were forced to second-guess whether the machines on which
they had voted had correctly recorded their preferences. The ensuing debacle
thrust blinking election officials into the spotlight, their motives studied with
skepticism. The public outcry was swift. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
immediately undertook a study of voting irregularities. 4 By November 18,
2001, the New York Times, Washington Post, and Sun-Sentinel released the
results of their attempts to corroborate or rebut the certified results.3" Former
Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter chaired a bipartisan commission
charged with evaluating the nation's voting technology. 6
Since then, a sense of wary cynicism pervades many discussions of ballot
integrity amid reports of a steady erosion in voter confidence. Numerous
studies tell tales of disaffected voters and a growing expectation that ballots
will be spoiled or miscounted, though recent research suggests that these
changes vary by demographic.37 A Gallup poll conducted shortly after the 2000
election, for instance, found that more than six in ten Americans had "little" or
"no confidence" in the nation's vote counting. 8 A National Election Study
during a similar period found that confidence in the fairness of elections had
dropped by a quarter. 39 And Democrats were not the only ones disaffected.
During that same timespan, twice as many Republicans considered the 2000
election "unfair." 40 Furthermore, a post-2004 election study by NBC and the

1.

33.

SALTMAN, supra note 20, at

34.

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES DURING THE 2000 ELECTION

(2001), availableat http://usccr.gov/pubs/vote2ooo/report/mail.htm.
3s. See Ford Fessenden, Ballots Cast by Blacks and Older Voters Were Tossed in Far Greater
Numbers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17; Dan Keating & John Mintz, FloridaBlack Ballots
Affected Most in 2ooo; Uncounted Votes Common, Survey Finds, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2001, at

A3; Sally Kestin, Buddy Nevins & John Maines, The Disenfranchised: Poor, Uneducated
Rejected Most in 2ooo Election, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 18, 2001, at F.
36. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, To ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS (2002).

37. See R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall & Morgan Llewellyn, On American Voter Confidence, 29
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (finding evidence of "substantial racial and
partisan 'gaps' in voter confidence").
38. See Andrew Kohut, Pew Research Ctr., Public Concern About the Vote Count and
Uncertainty
About
Electronic
Voting
Machines
(Nov.
6,
20o6),
http ://pewresearch.org/pubs/87/public-concern-about-the-vote-count-and-uncertaintyabout.
39. See Jeffrey Zaino & Jeanne Zaino, Election by Litigation: The Electoral Process Post-Bush v.
Gore, 62 DIsP. RESOL. J. 72, 76 (2007) (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 76-77.
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Wall Street Journal found that more than one in four Americans overall were
concerned that the vote count was "unfair. ' 4' As a broader observation, a
"significant portion of the U.S. voting population professed little confidence
that their vote [would] be counted as intended."4 2 A more recent study, based
on a random survey of voters following the 2006 midterm elections in two
competitive congressional districts found "substantial evidence that voters'
direct experience with the voting process influence[d] their voter confidence."4"
Importantly, "[w]hen voters use a voting machine that they agree produces
verifiable results, they are more confident in the election process."' In this
manner, data suggest that rates of voter confidence are tied to voters'
experiences at the polls: when voting machines fail, the effects extend beyond
the election results and permeate perceptions about the electoral system itself.
Spillover effects from botched elections nationwide have only exacerbated
these stirring signs of unrest. When voting technology in one jurisdiction -say
Miami-Dade County, Florida-fails to register votes or lacks the processes by
which to verify them, the validity of other jurisdictions' election results are
similarly thrown into question. Call these legitimacy externalities. As news of
spoiled ballots spreads, so does voter disillusionment, and those leaving the
polls in other states or counties are left to worry whether their vote, too, would
slip through the cracks. Real and perceived election snafus garner media
attention,45 which often frames such events in highly partisan terms. 46 Not
only does this phenomenon exist for presidential elections, where the results in

41.

See

NBC

NEWS/WALL

STREET

JOURNAL,

STUDY

#605

o

at

,

http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/polloo41217.pdf;
58%

Worried

About

2004

Voting

Debacle

1i

question

8,

Rasmussen Reports,

(Oct.

19,

2004),

http ://www.rasmussenreports.con/public-content/politics/election-2oo4/58_worried-abo
ut_2oo4_voting_debacle. A nationwide Pew/AP survey of registered voters had a similar
result with twelve percent of respondents expressing that they were "not at all" confident
about whether their ballots would be tallied properly. Kohut, supra note 38.
42. R. Michael Alvarez, Morgan Llewellyn & Thad E. Hall, Are Americans Confident Their Ballots
Are Counted? 1 (Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Working Paper No. 49, 2oo6), available
at http ://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/wps/vtp-wp49.pdf.
43. Lonna Rae Atkeson & Kyle L. Saunders, The Effect of Election Administration on Voter
Confidence: A Local Matter?, 40 PS: POL. Sc. & POL. 655, 657 (2007).
44. Id. at 658.

45.

See Alvarez et al., supra note 37, at 654-55 ("The media was the primary conduit through
which the public learned about election administration after 2000. Obviously, the media
plays an important role in shaping voter confidence because the media frames the issue of
voter confidence.").

46. Id. at 657 ("The specific issue of voter confidence is largely dealt with in the debate
surrounding voting technology, which is framed as a result of the partisan and political
context of a close election that had a highly partisan and bitter conclusion.").
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one county could have real effects on the national stage, but also in House and
Senate races where putative winners serve in national bodies. The same general
insight rings true in statewide races across districts. Ignoring these externalities
will only reinforce the perception that vote-counting problems will continue
unchecked, thus undermining incentives for voter engagement and the notion
of self-governance as a whole. When voters are led to believe their votes will
not be counted, fewer will see any utility in turning out on Election Day.
As a result, there is a genuine need for federal intervention to prevent
externalities from the weakest link-whether they arise from the missteps of
individual manufacturers or state election officials. Assertive action at the
federal level to enforce uniform standards and otherwise regulate the voting
machine industry could go far in restoring the nation's faith in the legitimacy
of their elected officials. Many voters seem to agree. A Washington Post/ABC
News poll taken in the wake of the 2000 election reported that sixty-one
percent of the public believed the federal government should establish rules for
voting in presidential elections, while only thirty-five percent wanted the states
and counties to continue to set them. 47 Thus, Congress has both the means and
the mandate to take bold steps toward protecting the integrity of America's
election.
B. Resource Disparities

Despite the externalities imposed on other jurisdictions, few states
currently possess the incentives to internalize the social costs of their resource
allocation decisions. Federal intervention, by contrast, can better coordinate
and collect information on the extent of these costs and who should bear them
to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. As it stands, very little data are
available on the quantifiable costs of election administration, helping to explain
the lack of systematic public attention to the issue. 4 8 This lack of sustained

attention, in turn, has stymied any large-scale attempt to implement a uniform
methodology for reporting election-related outlays. Election expenditures are
currently unreported in the Census of Governments, the annual U.S. Census

47.

See Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Public Backs Uniform U.S. Voting Rules: Poll Finds Wide
SupportforGuidelines on Ballots, Closing Times, Recounts, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at Ai.

48. See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 59
(2005) ("Information on the cost of elections is difficult to obtain, because both state and
local authorities are involved in running elections, and local authorities often neglect to track
what they spend on elections.").
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Bureau report on the costs of state and local government functions.49
Inconsistent accounting and data collection practices across states and counties
further highlight the need for coordinated and centralized information
gathering-a role naturally suited for the federal government. Without
sanctions or the empirical evidence necessary to assign blame, state election
officials have little motivation to invest in expensive new voting technology or
expend the political capital necessary to hold vendors accountable for machine
failures.
Notwithstanding the dearth of official cost data, various academic and
private studies have nevertheless attempted to estimate the magnitude of these
expenses. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, for example,
canvassed various county and state governments and found that they spent
approximately $1 billion dollars in the aggregate on election administration in
2000." To put this figure in context, counties generally spend over ten times
that amount on solid waste management and parks and recreation.5 1 The
Caltech/MIT report also itemized total expenses suggesting that, at least in
2000, voter registration and general administration accounted for most
expenses: roughly $300 million and $400 million, respectively. Reports from
the voting equipment industry and local budgets also reveal that equipment
purchases and maintenance amount to about $15o million to $200 million
annually, or roughly fifteen to twenty percent of total election administration
expenditures. These figures are surely different today given recent changes in
federal legislation, but they still give some sense of the scope of the costs at
issue. 2 A more assertive federal presence would further shed light on election
administration expenses across jurisdictions.
One clear observation is that the expenses of elections and voter
registration are borne mostly not by the state or federal government, but by
local governments and, even then, "only reluctantly. ''s3 This resource burden
lies largely on county and city governments, which are confronted with
decisions whether to allocate additional resources, on the one hand, to garbage
collection and police provision, or on the other hand, to buying new voting

49.

See, e.g.,

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

2007

CENSUS

OF

GOVERNMENTS,

available at

http://www.census.gov/govs/www/cog2oo7.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2oo8).
so.

This figure did not include some particularly large outlays on equipment. See CALTEcH/MIT
VOTING TECH. PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5o.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at

53.

Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 425

51.

(2004)

(citing

NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM,

supra note 36,
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equipment and enhancing election worker training. 4 Perhaps not surprisingly,
the balance often tips in favor of the former-in some counties more than
others.5 As such, outdated or inadequate voting technology reflects both
disparities in wealth and tax revenues across counties, as well as budgetary
decisions to spend funds on other municipal priorities. Smaller jurisdictions
are also inevitably forced to spend a disproportionate amount more on election
administration given their economies of scale. A survey of election data from
counties in nine states reveals that these economies of scale exist only for
precincts with over twenty-five thousand voters. 6 Insofar as one's right to vote
should not depend on "factors [like] geography, 's7 this location-dependent
variability is difficult to justify. In light of Bush v. Gore,s8 which some argue
renders the use of more "error-prone . ..voting technology in some areas

within the state but not others" a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, s9
such variation may elevate the issue from one of mere fairness to a bona fide
constitutional question.
Confronted with these interjurisdictional resource disparities, a stronger
federal presence could help to ensure that such inequalities do not translate
into systematic deprivations of the ability to vote .60 By establishing a minimum
floor, the federal government has the potential to help decrease resource
disparities across electoral jurisdictions and also marshal the benefits accruing
from economies of scale. This argument is, of course, familiar in other
contexts. Congress has long debated the need for federal intervention in
education- another traditionally state-centered system-on the grounds that
resource inequalities across school districts are indefensible. 6' Some support

54.

See

55.

56.

Id.; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 36, at 68 ("The costs of
election administration are borne almost entirely by the level least able to afford them:
county and city governments.").
See CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, supra note 14, at 50.

57.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) ("These voting cases and the reapportionment

NAT'L TASK FORCE ON ELECTION REFORM, ELECTION 2000: REVIEW
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE NATION'S ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATORS 3, 30 (2001).

AND

decisions serve to assure that citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for their
representatives regardless of factors of wealth or geography.").
58. 531 U.S. 98

(2000).

sg.

See Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore into a
Vehiclefor Reform?, 9 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 3 57 , 358 (2002).

6o.

Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Throdgh Privatization,116 HARv. L. REV. 1285,
1285-86 (2003) (arguing that the federal government has "greater resources at its disposal to
condition and shape the behavior of private contractors").

61.

See, e.g., An Examination of the FederalRole in School Finance:Hearings on Examining the Need

for School FinanceReform, Focusing on the Adequacy of EducationalFinance in the United States
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the No Child Left Behind Act 6 2 precisely on the grounds that standardized
benchmarks would contribute to the greater "likelihood that existing resource
disparities among schools will decline. ''61 A similar argument underpins the
need for a robust federal role in election administration and the procurement of
voting machines in particular.
Yet some have remarked that one of the "great curiosities" of the history of
election administration is that it has taken "so long for any significant federal
role to emerge. '6 4 Until recently, Congress had only enacted a handful of laws
governing election administration. The first was the Election Law of 1871,
which provided that votes in congressional elections were to be cast by "written
or printed ballot, any law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding," and
that any votes cast by other means (including voice votes) "shall be of none
effect. ''6 5 Even centuries ago, federal legislators, though hardly bold,
recognized their potential role in setting standards for state election practices.
The next iteration of legislation occurred in 1896, when an election gone awry
for the House in western New York was the impetus for a new federal law. The
returns showed that Henry C. Brewster had defeated William E. Ryan by
25,399 votes to 17,109. Ryan, however, insisted that 31,354 votes cast in
Rochester had been cast by voting machine, and were thus invalid given that
federal law required written ballots.6 6 A congressional committee investigated
and concluded that Brewster would have won anyway, even if the machines
had not been used.6 7 Brewster was thus awarded the seat.68
Nevertheless, Congress adopted a law on February 14, 1899, which stated
that "[a]ll votes for Representatives in Congress must be by written or printed
ballot, or voting machines the use of which has been duly authorized by the
State law; and all votes received or recorded contrary to this section shall be of

62.

and Its Effect on the Quality of Education, Before the Subcomm. on Education, Arts and
Humanities of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, lo3d Cong. 79 (1993) (statement
of Sen. Christopher Dodd).
No Child Left Behind Act of 2ool, 20 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of2o U.S.C.).

63.

PAUL E. PETERSON & MARTIN R. WEST, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND
PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 12 (2003).

64.

Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election Administration, 6
(2007) (reviewing SALTMAN, supra note 20).

65.

SALTMAN,

supra note 20, at 82.

66. Id. at 117-18.
67.

Id. at 118.

68.

Id.
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no effect." 6" In other words, the new statute provided that congressional
elections could be conducted either by ballot or on voting machines. An
important effect of this new law was that it ensured that each state government
would be in "charge of the approval of voting machines"-a trend that
continues to the present. 7° Since this trend was only precipitated by statute,
however, congressional action could just as easily shift the responsibility to a
federal agency or, at the very least, set national standards in conjunction with
those of the states.
But just because Congress has the authority to enact legislation does not
mean that the wholesale centralization of election administration is a panacea.
Asking the federal government to become more involved with the purchase of
voting machinery might raise the worry that the party in control of Congress
and the White House would be able to entrench itself in future elections. This
entrenchment could occur, for instance, through contracts awarded to captured
vendors who would then manipulate the machines to achieve some
predetermined electoral outcome. The uneasiness would deepen with the
knowledge that most states and counties use the same machinery in both
federal and nonfederal elections. In this view, decentralization helps ensure
that voting machine control is better dispersed across various interests and
parties. This kind of pluralist objection, however, gives short shrift to the
already discussed drawbacks of ceding complete control to the states. The most
pragmatic solution will thus likely strike some middle ground between
centralized federal standards and creative experimentation in the states.
II.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS

If legitimacy externalities and resource disparities underscore the need for
federal reform, the critical issue, then, is what form such intervention should
take. When public infrastructure fails-whether bridges collapse or tunnels
implode- citizens rightly demand answers from both private contractors and
the officials charged with overseeing them. Newspaper columnists scream:
"Media, Demand ... Accountability. '71 Pundits solemnly pronounce that "as
citizens ...we have a responsibility to hold our government accountable for

69. Act of Feb. 14, 1899, ch. 154, 30 Star. 836 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 9 (2000)).
70. SALTMAN, supra note 20, at 118.
71. E.g., Colleen Patrick, Media, Demand KatrinaAccountability, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Sept. 8, 2005, at B9.
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disasters they cause." 72 These moments of perceived crisis are not the only
motivations driving demands for accountability, but they are usually the most
powerful. If the 2000 presidential election laid bare the problems with voting
equipment, more recent elections have only added to the chorus.73 Changes in
technology have further wrought new fears about the validity of election results
and the attendant ability to verify them. Accordingly, a growing number of
citizens and commentators alike has demanded accountability from those who
manufacture voting machinery.
When invoked, however, the concept of "accountability" conveys a
reformist cachet, but often at the expense of careful analytical delineation. 74 As
a first pass, the word by itself suggests that voters should, at a minimum, have
the ability to call to account those entrusted to count their votes accurately.
Holding a party accountable requires both the means to force an accounting, as
well as a set of liabilities based on that accounting. Whether these demands for
accountability are successfully met, in turn, largely depends on the relevant
institutional mechanisms available for doling out carrots and wielding sticks.
These accountabilitytools, as I shall call them, comprise the instruments through
which actors extract explanations, and praise or blame them accordingly. In
other words, they provide the institutional means by which an aggrieved party
obtains an accounting and sanctions those responsible for errors revealed
through that accounting. Accountability tools, in turn, are a smaller subset of
what some have referred to as "policy tools," or the "tools or instruments
through which governments seek to influence citizen behavior and achieve

72.

Elizabeth Anderson, Letter to the Editor, Tunnel Tragedy: A Case of Compromised Public
Safety, BOSTON GLOBE, July, 12, 2006, at A8 (calling for greater accountability in the wake of
the Big Dig tunnel collapse in Boston).

73.

See Lisa Guernsey, Holding the Vote-Counting Machines Accountable, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2oo4, at G8; Scott Wyland, Florida: Elections Chief Urges Citizens To Demand Vote
21,
2006,
J.,
May
BEACH
NEWS
Accountability,
DAYTONA
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6357.

74.

See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and InstitutionalDesign: Some Thoughts on the Grammarof
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 115
(Michael Dowdle ed., 2006) (describing the concept of accountability as "protean");
Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 2073, 2074 (2005) ("Some of the proposals that have been associated with . . .
accountability have obvious merits, some have subtle merits, and some have obvious or
subtle demerits. Very few of them, however, have very much to do with the concept of
accountability. Invocation of this concept confers a certain cachet on these proposals -it
makes them fashionable - but it neither justifies nor illuminates them.").
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policy purposes. "TsThese tools can take many forms- lawsuits, statutes, audits,
external inspections- each with respective strengths and weaknesses.76
77
Although the literature is rife with various taxonomies of accountability,
this Part will draw upon two familiar conceptions -public and private
accountability- as a heuristic for exploring the range of accountability tools
and why some are more likely to be successful than others in the electoral
context. Public accountability regimes largely rely upon elections as
legitimating institutions and look to the political process as a means of
sanctioning bad actors. Private accountability regimes, by contrast, rely upon
the market forces of supply and demand -calibrated to profit-maximizationto punish underperforming parties .78 Examining why features of these regimes
are missing in the current context will then provide an analytic framework for
identifying the kinds of institutional design features to which our election
reform efforts should aspire.
A. The Katherine HarrisProblem

At first, relying on the concept of public accountability to vindicate election
integrity seems like a bad joke, for at its core this kind of regime mainly
(though not solely) relies on elections as a sanctioning mechanism. 79 Early
movements in administrative law, for example, understood the enterprise as an
effort "to reconcile the operation of the federal bureaucracy with the basic
political values of. . .representative democracy and public accountability of

75.

Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, BehavioralAssumptions of Policy Tools, 52 J. POL. 510, 511-20
(199o); see ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE

8

(1953).

See generally Theodore J.Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 298 (1972) (comparing and contrasting various policy tools).
77. See, e.g., Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 Am.POL. Sci. REV. 29 (2005) (proposing "participation" and "delegation" models
of accountability); Mashaw, supra note 74, at 118-26 (providing a "partial taxonomy" of
"accountability regimes"). While this literature is theoretically rich, instead of searching for
a conceptual consensus, I seek only to define particular terms as I use them in order to
advance my more substantive argument.
76.

78. See Minow, supra note 21, at 1263 ("Private economic markets generate accountability

79.

through the operation of supply and demand, which tests the viability of ideas, products,
and processes by their ability to attract and maintain a sufficient number of purchasers to
meet costs and generate desirable profits.").
See Mashaw, supra note 74, at 120-21 (arguing that one of the most visible forms of "public
governance accountability" -what he calls "political accountability" -is the election).

HeinOnline -- 118 Yale L. J. 761 2008-2009

118:744

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

2009

public office holders through competitive elections. '' 8 ° But this phenomenonthe perception that partisans are calling the shots -is more than mere irony.
Rather, it is a real and persistent feature of our current election administration
system that might usefully be referred to as the Katherine Harrisproblem. The
Katherine Harris problem is the gnawing notion that election winners charged
with holding election administrators accountable also lack the incentives to do
so after they have won. The well-publicized consequences of this peculiar
feature of our electoral system are familiar. Perhaps most famously, during the
2000 election, Katherine Harris served as both co-chair of Florida's BushCheney campaign and the state's chief election officer." Amid calls for a
recount, Harris and the Democratic Attorney General clashed over the
statutory grounds for doing so.82 After the Florida Supreme Court ruled
against her, Harris announced that all recounts had to be finished by
November 14, 2000.83 Again, she was rebuffed by the state supreme court,
which moved the deadline to November 26, 2000. s4 When one county sought a
further extension, Harris denied the request, 8s and instead certified a BushCheney victory in Florida by 537 votes.86 Unsurprisingly, many viewed Harris's
motives with suspicion. s Consequently, to many, Katherine Harris quickly
became a symbol for the idea that the very institutions designed to keep elected
officials in check also depend on those same officials for oversight. Are foxes
guarding the henhouse? 8

8o.

DAVID A. SCHULTZ & ROBERT M.ARANTO, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 74 (1998);
see also Rubin, supra note 74, at 2074 ("[T]he idea that elected officials are accountable rests

on the principle of election, where one chooses another to express or represent her
views .... ").
81.

See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION

29 (2006).
82.

Id. at 30; see

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE

CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 92-94 (2001).
83.

OVERTON,

supra note 81, at 30.

84. Id. at 31.
85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 32.

87.

See POSNER, supra note 82, at 245 ("The Florida election officials' interpretations of the code
were reasonable . . . but the widespread suspicion that their motivation was political is
understandable, to say the least.").

s8.

Cf. Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Casefor Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REv. 649 (2002) (arguing

that politically motivated redistricting is more desirable than judicial efforts to police it).
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Though there is some degree of professionalization, most states' chief
election officials are partisanly elected, while others are appointed.8 9 These
same officials routinely participate as candidates in races they are responsible
for overseeing or act as leaders of their respective political parties. In 2000, for
example, the secretaries of state in Arizona, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and
Ohio also chaired their states' reelection campaigns for President Bush. 90 More
recently, secretaries of state in at least seven states have overseen gubernatorial
or congressional races in which they were also candidates. 9 There is little
surprise, then, when those called upon to certify the election results often call
shots or interpret standards in ways that happen to benefit their parties.
But the scope of this decision-making power starts not after the polls close,
but reaches as far back to when the voting equipment itself is chosen. And even
there, partisanship - or at least the perception of partisanship-continues to
pervade. While federal ethics rules require lawmakers to wait a year after
leaving office before taking jobs as lobbyists, no such prohibitions exist for
election officials. As a result, "there is a revolving door between election
administration and the voting machine industry."92 Recently, top election
officials in at least five states left their government posts to become lobbyists
for the growing voting machine industry after HAVA granted billions of
dollars to states to update their machines. 93 When California Secretary of State
Bill Jones left office in 2003, for example, he became a consultant to Sequoia
Voting Systems. The Assistant Secretary of State also joined Sequoia fulltime.94 Similarly, former secretaries of state from Florida and Georgia joined
Election Systems & Software and Diebold Election Systems, respectively, as
lobbyists. 9 San Diego's Deborah Seiler went to work in 1991 as a customer
service and sales representative for two voting machine vendors after more

89. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Marginof Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration
To Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 974-76 (2005) (noting that state

chief election officials are elected in thirty-three states). Locally, there is even greater
variation, as the state-based method of selection does not necessarily match that employed
by the local. In California, for example, the secretary of state runs in a partisan election, but
on the county level the local official may either be a county clerk elected in a nonpartisan
election or a registrar of voters appointed by and serving under the county board of
supervisors. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26802 (West 2008).
go. See Urbina, supra note 7.

g. Id.
92.

Id.

93. Id.; see infra Section II.B.

94. Editorial, On the Voting Machine Makers' Tab, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.

12,

2004, at WKI2.

9s. Id.
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than a decade of service as the chief elections officer. 96 By 2004, Seiler was a
county election official again, where she negotiated contracts for voting
machines. 97 When election officials charged with choosing and accepting bids
for voting equipment have recent ties to the companies who manufacture
them, the temptation for self-dealing is great. Even more perniciously, the
potential for collusion increases, and voters are left to wonder whether the
machines before them were rigged in favor of the party most eager to walk
through the revolving door.
In this manner, the touchstones of traditional public accountabilityelections - are inappropriate as a principled means of vindicating the legitimacy
of American elections themselves. The Katherine Harris problem is, for now, a
persistent feature of our electoral system. This problem manifests itself both in
terms of the perceived self-dealing of partisanly appointed or elected election
officials, as well as the revolving door between the voting machine industry
and political parties. Because public accountability is an inadequate heuristic
for understanding the kind of mechanisms that are necessary to foster election
integrity, it is necessary to look to other accountability tools and how they
might create the proper incentives for sanctioning election administrators and
voting machine vendors alike.
B. The Stunted Market Problem
This nexus among candidates, election administrators, and private
contractors underscores the special nature of the accountability problem in the
election context. Securing public confidence in elections will depend both on
public accountability tools that can regulate the relevant private parties, as well
as private accountability measures to check partisan public officials. Put
differently, just as public regulation is often justified in the wake of market
failure, markets can also step in where government agents have failed. In these
circumstances, "privatization will replace political accountability with market
accountability . . . competitive suppliers will prevail and eliminate the poor
ones." ' 8 Insofar as partisanship will always threaten the legitimacy of election
results, private accountability tools can help prevent the inevitable temptations
that arise from asking politicians to regulate themselves. Market incentives for

96. See Urbina, supra note 7.
97. Id.
98. Peter Hettich, Governance by Mutual Benchmarking in Postal Markets: How State-Owned
EnterprisesMay Induce PrivateCompetitors To Observe Policy Goals, 32 U. DAYTON L. REv. 199,
216 (2007).

HeinOnline -- 118 Yale L. J. 764 2008-2009

PRIVATIZING

DEMOCRACY

profit and reputation among repeat players would penalize manufacturers who
produce faulty machines and the election officials who continue to contract
with them. By decoupling the Katherine Harris problem and voting technology
investment decisions, the nation's election infrastructure would more likely
serve democratic values like security, transparency, and accuracy.
Numerous characteristics of the private market for voting machines,
however, suggest that it is unlikely to be a robust one on its own. Elections are
relatively infrequent, occurring only once or twice a year. The barriers to entry
in terms of start-up costs and capital can be formidable. 99 The resulting lack of
competition and new market players stymies innovation. Unfortunately,
Congress's short-sighted Help America Vote Act (HAVA) stunted whatever
potential there was for proper market incentives to promote electoral
integrity.1"' Passed in 2oo2, HAVA provided over $3.8 billion in federal
funding to spend on election administration reform,"' including $325 million
for states to replace or upgrade their voting equipment."' Section 1o2
authorized payments to states for the replacement of punch card or lever voting
machines as long as they could commit to the replacements in time for the
November 2004 election, extendible for good cause until the first general
election held after January 1, 2006.103 Twenty-three states sought and received
such a waiver. 1 4 Because the Act encouraged the relatively quick purchase and
replacement of voting technology, it limited opportunities and incentives for
the industry to develop best practices, experiment with different technologies,
and cultivate professional relationships with election officials in identifying
their constituents' needs.
The legislation instituted a number of deadlines that spurred the quick sale
of existing technology rather than allowing time to vet and test better-designed
models or develop newer ones, thus undermining the market's power to spur

99. See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Transparency and Access to Source Code in Electronic Voting

http.://www.josephhall.org/papers/jhall-evto6.pdf
(describing barriers to entry in the voting machine market).
(2oo6),

100. 42 U.S.C.

§§

(unpublished

12-13

manuscript)

15,301-15,545 (Supp. V. 2005).

im.

Id. §§ 15,304, 15,407, 15,424, 15,443, 15,453, 15,472.

1o2.

See id. §

15,301-15,302,

ELECTION REFORM

15,481; ELECTION REFORM INFO. PROJECT, UNIV. OF RICHMOND,

BRIEFINGS:

THE BUSINESS OF ELECTIONS 8

(2004),

available at

http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Election-reform/elect
ionline-o811o4.pdf.
103. 42 U.S.C.

§ 15,302.

104. United States Election Assistance Commission, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding

Appropriate Uses of HAVA Funds (Oct. 20o6), http://www.eac.gov/election/HAVA
Funds/docs/legal-faq2ol9a.pdf/attachment-download/file.
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innovation. Critically, the Help America Vote Act required that any money
unspent by the final deadline of January 1, 20o6, be repaid to the federal
government.' °5 For the producers of voting machines, HAVA was thus
immediately recognized as an "unprecedented" revenue boon. 1 6 Increasing
their market share would depend primarily on their ability to sell quickly; thus,
"there was little incentive to develop 'better' machines and every incentive to
sell as many machines as possible."' 7 And those who won the race won big.
Four companies -Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems & Software
(ES&S), Sequoia Voting Systems, and Hart InterCivic- count eighty percent
of all the ballots in America. , 8 Diebold alone has sold more than 130,000
voting machines resulting in revenues of at least $230 million. 0 9 Although this
handful of companies dominates, the industry has also seen rapid growth, with
at least nineteen known vendors competing for multimillion dollar state and
local contracts.110
Because the burgeoning voting industry is still nascent-with novel
technology features demanded rapidly in response to newly discovered flaws standards for security, functionality, and accessibility have fluctuated greatly.
Against this backdrop, states have found themselves saddled with deficient
voting machines and increasingly dependent upon vendors for maintenance
and technical support."' By encouraging purchases, HAVA stymied incentives
for innovation and ensured that future upgrades would occur "only
infrequently and at great cost to state and local election agencies."" 2' In other
words, the Help America Vote Act stunted a potentially robust market by
artificially inflating demand and encouraging quick and expensive investments
in still-developing technology. Because suppliers were competing in a relatively
new market with eager and impatient buyers, they had little incentive to
develop and test products that could better help guarantee election integrity.
Furthermore, HAVA had no funding provisions for subsequent years of

105.42 U.S.C.
1o6.

§ 15,302.

Warren Stewart, Do You Know How Your Vote Will Be Counted?, WASH. SPECTATOR, Mar. 1,
2006, at 1.

107.

Id.

lo8. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.,

Will the Next Election Be Hacked?, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 5,

20o6, at

42.

lo9. See id. at 43.
11o.

ELECTION REFORM INFO. PROJECT, supra note 102, at 5.

iii.

See ELLEN THEISEN, VENDORS ARE UNDERMINING THE STRUCTURE OF U.S. ELECTIONS 22
(20o8), http ://www.votersunite.org/info/ReclaimElections.pdf.
Brandon Fail, Comment, HAVA's Unintended Consequences: A Lessonfor Next Time, 116 YALE
L.J. 493,494 (20o6).

112.
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equipment and maintenance, leaving counties to fend for themselves in
negotiating warranties or service contracts. 13'
At least one commentator has also pointed out that "HAVA's strict fouryear timetable encouraged and entrenched the practice of purchasing election
equipment, despite the fact that leasing may well be a better option.""14 Many
counties in Rhode Island, Maryland, and a few other states currently engage in
the practice, and the results have been promising."' 5 Leasing both avoids the
large upfront investments in equipment and better accommodates upgrades.
States can also strike lease agreements that actually lower total costs over the
long run, despite short-term premiums. In Rhode Island, for example, the
state legislature stipulated that they would only lease from ES&S if the total
cost, including service and equipment, was less each year than maintaining the
state's lever machines." 6 Rhode Island's lease-to-own agreements -including
maintenance, service, and consulting-cost approximately $1.50 per voter per
year (over fifteen years)."' A report published by the Maryland Secretary of
State's office similarly suggests that leasing costs range from $1 to $3 per voter
per year, depending on population density." 8 These estimates are only slightly
higher than what some counties currently budget annually for their voting
equipment purchases and maintenance.1 9
In addition to subverting the market mechanisms that may have increased
competition or created a secondary leasing market, HAVA's regulatory
structure also lacks real authority and consistently fails to exercise what little
authority it does possess. As a result, the Act neglects to provide an
institutional apparatus that might otherwise substitute public accountability
measures for the markets it displaced. HAVA's Title II, for instance, established
the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to serve as an information
clearinghouse and provide election assistance with the active involvement of
the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and
Technology."' In many ways, "[t]he EAC was designed to have as little
regulatory power as possible,''. with an even number of members (four) and

113.

See THEISEN, supra note iii, at 22.

114.

Fail, supra note

115. CALTECH/MIT
116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

112,

at 494 (emphases omitted).

VOTING TECH. PROJECT, supra note 14, at 52.

iig. Id.

§§

120.

42 U.S.C.

121.

Shambon, supra note 53, at 428.

15,321-15,362 (SUpp. V. 2005).
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three-member approval required to undertake any action. "For the most part,
[the Commission] cannot 'issue rules, promulgate regulations, or impose any
requirement on a state or unit of local government.' 122 Among the EAC's
duties are to develop and adopt voluntary guidelines on provisional voting,
statewide voter registration databases, and mail-in registration; 2 ' to conduct
studies on election administration;14 and to research methods of improving
access for voters with disabilities and those who are not proficient in English.'
While the EAC does not have the power to impose binding requirements on
state and local election officials, it does have the power-indeed the6
responsibility- to conduct research and issue nonbinding guidance. ,
Accordingly, in 2005, the EAC released the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
for
system
functional
requirements,
performance
characteristics,
documentation requirements, and evaluation criteria for the national
certification of voting systems. 117 The guidelines took effect in December 2007,
at which time voting systems would no longer be tested against the 2002
voting system standards developed by the Federal Election Commission.128
Even then, however, voting systems will likely be tested by independent
testing authorities (ITAs), private entities that contract directly with private
vendors to conduct manual and automated source code review, documentation
review, and some systems-level testing of full voting systems.2 9 Each voting
system must pass both hardware and software testing by an ITA before it is
considered "federally qualified" and given a National Association of State
Election Directors identification number. 30

1i2.Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 15,329).
§ 15,5o(a).

123.

42 U.S.C.

124.

Id. §

125.

Id. § 15,441(a)-(b).
Id. § 15,322(1), (3).

126.
127.

15,322(3).

States may decide, however, to adopt these guidelines before the effective date. See GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, ELECTIONS: FEDERAL

EFFORTS To IMPROVE

SECURITY

AND

RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS ARE UNDER WAY, BUT KEY ACTIVITIES NEED

To BE
128.

COMPLETED

See ERIc A.

17-18

FISCHER,

CONGRESSIONAL

(2005),

availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do5956.pdf.

FEDERAL VOLUNTARY

RESEARCH

SERVICE

REPORT
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SYSTEM

FOR CONGRESS

FAQs,
available at

GUIDELINES:

1 (20o6),

http://assets.opencrs.con/rpts/RS22363_2oo6o111.pdf.
129.

130.

See ELLEN THEISEN, MYTH BREAKERS: FACTS ABOUT
(describing
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and
certification
http ://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf.

18-24
available

ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS

processes),

Id.

HeinOnline -- 118 Yale L. J. 768 2008-2009

(2005)

at

PRIVATIZING DEMOCRACY

Because the testing and qualification process is conducted under a
confidential contract between the ITA and the vendor applying for
qualification, the results are kept secret from election officials, the media, and
the general public.131 "While some states allow any voting system to be offered
for sale that has been certified to meet the voluntary federal standards, many
states impose additional requirements. In these states, vendors must
demonstrate that they have met these additional standards before offering their
machines for sale in that state."'32 Most states contract out to the ITAs to
ensure that vendors meet these additional standards.'3 3 As such, the overall
system is highly fragmented, decentralized, and nontransparent.
By allowing states the ultimate authority to set standards and contract with
private testing authorities, HAVA had the effect of shifting from a system of
local control with loose state and federal oversight to one with stronger state
control and still weak federal oversight. While the EAC issues voluntary federal
guidelines for voting equipment, states are the entities finally charged with
deciding whether to adopt these testing and certification requirements entirely,
in part, or not at all. As of 2004, twenty-six states using DRE equipment for
the first time required voting systems to be certified according to federal
requirements. 3 4 Others may require state certification of voting systems but do
not require national testing."' Based on an April

2005

survey, the EAC has

identified at least thirty states that require their voting systems to meet federal
standards issued by the Federal Election Commission, EAC, or both." 6 Despite
these limited incentives for compliance, the ultimate discretion in terms of
what kind of voting technology to use, and who to buy it from continues to lie
with the states. Even though most states have currently adopted federally
promulgated standards, their continuing compliance remains strictly voluntary
with no consistent means of enforcement.

131.

Id.

132.

DOUGLAS

133.

voting/testing.shtml.
Id.

W.

JONES, TESTING VOTING SYSTEMS (2004),

http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-jones/

134. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTIONS: ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT ARE NEEDED To
ADDRESS
ELECTRONIC VOTING
SYSTEM
CHALLENGES
37 (2oo7), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do7576t.pdf.
135.

Id. at 17.

136.

Id.
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CONTRACTS AS AN ACCOUNTABILITY TOOL

If partisanship renders public accountability mechanisms necessarily
suspect while emaciated markets subvert private forms of accountability,
accountability tools in the election context must find creative ways to replicate
features of both. This Part explores those aspects of both regimes best suited to
confront the unique problems that confound the administration of elections.
Public measures are essential in still-nascent voting machine markets to
establish federal oversight mechanisms that emphasize transparency and
prevent legitimacy externalities, kept in check by electoral mandates. Private
measures, in turn, are crucial for creating external incentives based on the
bottom line, independent of the Katherine Harris problem of perceived selfdealing. These regimes-public and private accountability- are not always
mutually distinct, but they help to model the dimensions along which
incremental reforms might be pursued. Because both sets of institutional
design features are often at cross-purposes, they must be well ordered to
induce profit-driven innovation at one stage, even if it entails disclosing trade
secrets or allowing public access and verification in another.
Against this backdrop, procurement contracts emerge as an important,
though largely overlooked, accountability tool. Procurement contracts
encompass an important hybridization of traditionally public and private
principles well-suited to mimicking market relationships through bargaining
and maintaining important baselines through mandatory clauses. On the one
hand, procurement contracts resemble traditional commercial contracts with
their respective causes of action and remedies. On the other hand, government
procurement at all levels also requires contractors to follow a well-developed
13 7
body of regulations designed to achieve a battery of public norms.
Procurement contracts thus offer features of both public and private
accountability that can be marshaled in fruitful ways. While their use is
certainly not new-state governments have regularly used procurement
contracts to purchase voting machines - it is time to draw renewed attention to
how such contracts can be designed to serve uniquely democratic values.

137. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 164-65; see also Elissa Bretz, The ABCs of Accountability: Can
Federal Contracting Regulations Fix School Privatization?,36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 667, 677-79
(2007) (describing policies underlying federal procurement process); Steven Kelman,
Buying Commercial: An Introduction and Framework, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 249, 250-51 (1998)
(explaining various requirements imposed by "statute and regulation" in the government
contracting process).
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A. Diversifying the Toolkit
Governments have long procured from private vendors a multitude of
goods and services, ranging from office supplies to weapons systems."38

Relative to internal production, purchasing from external vendors allows the
government flexibility and the delegation of expertise and research to outside
firms. 3 9 Though procurement regulations vary widely across states,' 4 ° general
principles of procurement help shed light upon the ethos underlying the
procurement regulation system as a whole. At their core are two norms that
promote both public and private accountability: transparency and fair
competition. 41 While the latter promotes best-value and market sanctions, the
former allows those affected to demand information from vendors and officials
alike.
What has not, however, been well articulated in the literature -particularly
on election administration reform -is the procurement contract's potential role
for fostering greater access to the technology responsible for facilitating
elections. Technological purchases particularly demand rethinking about the
dynamic relationship between government officials and manufacturers, who
must be relied upon to service and provide updates as public uses for a specific
technology evolve.' 42 As the federal government has become an increasingly
"prominent purchaser in the private marketplace," attaching "collateral
conditions to procurement contracts" is an increasingly effective tool for
shaping public policy. 43 Procurement contracts present a wide range of options
for meeting needs unique to the voting machine market and its attendant need

138.

See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 42-43 (1995); Freeman, supra note
at 155.

27,

139. See STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE FEAR OF DISCRETION
AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (1990).

140. See Daniel I. Gordon, Constructinga Bid Protest Process: The Choices That Every Procurement
Challenge System Must Make, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 427, 435 (2006) ("[D]ifferent levels of

Government may have different procurement law systems (as the individual states do in the
United States) .... ").
141. See Christopher R. Yukins, Integrating Integrity and Procurement: The United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, 36 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 307, 308

(2007)

("Policymakers crafting a sound procurement system must balance a

number of goals. Of those goals, experience has shown that competition, transparency, and
integrity are probably the most important." (emphasis omitted)).
See KELMAN, supra note 139, at 1-2 (discussing how government purchases of computer
technology present unique considerations regarding the need for innovation and flexibility).
143. Andrew George Sakallaris, Questioning the Sacred Cow: Reexamining theJustificationsfor Small
142.

Business Set Asides, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 685, 686-87 (2007).
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for democratic legitimacy. Each of these options must be evaluated with a keen
eye toward preventing the negative externalities that threaten and undermine
voter confidence.
Federal procurement contracts are currently governed by elaborate
statutory and regulatory requirements, including the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR).'" The FAR establishes detailed procedures for almost every
aspect of the procurement process including notice, competition, awards, and
contract management. '4' The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, in turn,
requires the federal government to use two defined methods of competitive bid
procedures: sealed bidding and competitive proposals. 46 The sealed bidding
process essentially entails formally advertising specific procurement needs and
then awarding the contract based on the lowest bid.' 47 Using price as the sole
criterion for government contracts can be an attractive metric because it
14
removes discretion from public officials, while also saving taxpayers money. 8
Procurement by competitive proposals, by contrast, involves the
publication of a request for proposals (RIP) that notifies vendors of that which
the government seeks. Bidders respond to the RIP with written proposals and
often live demonstrations of specified tasks. The government then selects the
vendor whose proposal best matches the criteria in the R-P. 4 9 Unlike sealed
bidding, competitive proposals are intended to allow greater discretion and the
recognition of criteria other than price alone.'
At the same time, this
discretion is still constrained through further regulations that restrict the
specific rules, criteria, and information that can be used to award the final
contract.'' Because an express purpose of the Federal Acquisition Regulation is

144. The FAR states, for example, that one of its key purposes is "[p]romoting competition." 48
C.F.R. § 13.1o4 (2007). The principal requirements are contained in Tides io and 41 of the
United States Code, see io U.S.C. S 2202, 2302-2331 (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 251-266, and the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. pts. 1-53. The Tide lo provisions cover
procurement by the Armed Forces, Coast Guard, and NASA. See 1o U.S.C. 5 2303. The Title
41 provisions cover procurement by the federal government generally and executive
agencies. See 41 U.S.C. § 252.
145. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 1.
146. 41 U.S.C. § 253.
147. See KELmAN, supra note 139, at 15.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 18-19.
150. Id.
151. Id. ("The three major limitations on discretion in procurement by competitive proposals are

the rules and practices for establishing the government's requirements, the criteria by which
proposals from vendors are evaluated, and the information that may be used in evaluating
proposals against those criteria.").
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to promote "business [conducted] with integrity, fairness, and openness,' 5 2
agencies are required to set out detailed evaluation criteria and follow these
criteria when awarding a contract. Most major government purchases of
information technology including electronic voting machines are acquired
through competitive proposals. 3
Given the relative lack of traditional administrative law constraints in many
states,'5 4 the competitive contracting process is an important -though undertheorized- accountability mechanism. When purchasing voting machines,
state and local governments are not contracting to allow private actors to play
significant roles performing ongoing public services in the same way as they
might for, say, private prisons.' At the same time, they are not contracting for
the purchase of a discrete good. Instead, election officials are, in effect,
purchasing the mechanization of vote counting, including the machinery and a
bundle of services like repair and expertise. As a result, while procurement
contracts do not raise precisely the same oversight and "public function"
questions as in the more purely service delivery context,1" 6 they can

152.

48 C.F.R.

§

1.1o2(b)( 3 ) (2008).

153. See KELMAN, supra note 139, at 8, 18. For examples of RFPs for vote-counting technology,

see Verified Voting Foundation, Voting Equipment RFPs Issued
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6129 (last visited Dec.

to Date,
2008).

IS,

154. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional
Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 551, 555 (2001) (describing how state institutions differ from
federal ones in ways that undermine traditional administrative law constraints: state
legislatures are "more prone to faction" and apt to "produc[e] ... incoherent regulatory
schemes"; state executive branches lack mechanisms of direct electoral accountability; and
state judges are less independent). State legislatures also meet less frequently than Congress
does so they often exercise greater control through rules review procedures at the expense of
a robust separation of powers. See id. at 562-68. Once again, however, asking elected
legislators to review regulations for the acquisition of vote-counting equipment is yet
another version of the Katherine Harris problem. Similarly, many state judges are elected, so
even judicial review over state procurement regulations is subject to heightened suspicion in
the election administration context.
1ss. There

is a large literature on the implications of prison privatization. See, e.g., BYRON
EUGENE PRICE, MERCHANDIZING PRISONERS: WHO REALLY PAYS FOR PRISON PRIVATIZATION?

(2006) (exploring the implications of publicly traded for-profit prisons); Sharon Dolovich,
State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005) (calling for a reevaluation of

punishment practices in light of state private prisons); Charles H. Logan, Well Kept:
Comparing Quality of Confinement in Private and PublicPrisons,83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
577 (1992) (comparing empirical indices of quality between public and private prisons).
156. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); G. Sidney Buchanan, A
Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Searchfor Governmental Responsibility, 34
Hous. L. REV. 333, 345 (1997).
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nevertheless play a central role in securing and enforcing consistent election
integrity.
B. Procurement'sPromise
But what kind of role should procurement contracts play in promoting
election integrity? Procurement contracts are, by design, relatively flexible in
the scope of their provisions since governments have wide latitude in their
requests for competitive proposals and the terms upon which they enter into
contractual agreements.1 7 The heterogeneity of current procurement practices
in election technology, in turn, reflects the wide variation in state8
implementation plans submitted pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. ,
After HAVA's enactment, some states moved aggressively to purchase one
Direct Record Electronic (DRE) system for the whole state."5 9 Some delayed
their choices because of federal funding uncertainty, questions over what the
EAC would ultimately decide constituted HAVA Title III compliance,"6 o a
desire for technological improvements, 6 ' or controversies over DRE
security. 6' 2 Some decided to leave the choice wholly to local governments. 6 3
Several states simply retained their current systems like paper balloting for
budgetary reasons. 6 4
There are currently four major procurement regimes across states: statelevel procurement of one voting system, state-level procurement of multiple
voting systems, local level procurement, and a "wait and see" method. 6, Under
the first method, which is deployed in six states, 66 state governments control
the entire procurement process and have purchased one voting system for
either the entire state, or only those jurisdictions that needed their machines
replaced. In contrast, two states-Ohio and Michigan-have taken a more
intermediary approach by negotiating contracts with several vendors (in the

157.

See Lewis J. Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State and Local Level: A Hodgepodge of

158.

Remedies, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 265, 285 (1996).
See Shambon, supra note 53, at 431-37.
See id. at 432 (Mississippi and South Carolina).

isg.

163.

Id.
Id. (Connecticut, Nebraska, and Vermont).
Id.
Id. (Massachusetts).

164.

Id. at 433.

16o.
161.
162.

supra note 102, at 12.
Id. (Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, and South Carolina).

165. ELECTION REFORM INFO. PROJECT,
166.
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hopes of receiving better prices through bulk purchases) and then allowing
counties to select from this list. 6' A number of other states, including
Pennsylvania and California, have continued the traditional practice of
allowing local officials to purchase voting systems for their jurisdictions.
Others are waiting to see whether the EAC and National Institute of Standards
and Technology will provide more specific guidelines on the procurement
high quality machinery and are allowing
process; these states hope to purchase
68
others to test various models.'
Since procurement practices vary widely across states, federal legislation
requiring standard provisions in every state voting machine contract would
introduce some much needed uniformity. These narrow mandatory clauses
could preserve the discretion and tailoring necessary for local budgets, while at
the same time promoting structured competition around baseline national
requirements. Procurement contracts can thus serve as a gap-filling mechanism
against the current backdrop of weak regulatory oversight and lack of
centralized coordination. These contracts have the potential to function as a
crucial accountability mechanism that should be thought of in tandem with
other tools in the broader policy toolkit, creating the necessary "multiple" and
"overlapping" accountability checks on the rationality and transparency of
decisionmaking. 69 Procurement contracts can be especially valuable in the
electoral context because of their ability to create ex ante incentives through
RFPs and negotiations encouraging manufacturers and officials to work
together toward the same result: voting technology that not only records and
counts votes accurately, but also can be publicly verified.
Indeed, this very impulse for joint cooperation lies at the heart of recent
legal challenges. In Americansfor Safe Access v. County ofAlameda, for instance,
proponents of marijuana legalization cited California's Election Code and
Constitution in challenging a defeated ballot measure that lost by a margin of
191 votes.17 ' The trial court ruled that after the lawsuit was filed, county
election officials should have preserved the data on Diebold machines in case of
a court-ordered recount.' 71 Specifically, the judge found that county officials
had not only failed to retrieve backup data from electronic voting machines'

167.

Id.

168.

Id.

169.

Jocelyn M. Johnston & Barbara S. Romzek, Contractingand Accountability in State Medicaid
Reform: Rhetoric, Theories, and Reality, 59 PUB. ADMIN. RV. 383, 387 (1999).

17o. Amended Complaint, Ams. for Safe Access v. County of Alameda, No. RG 04-192053, at

26(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec.

30,

2004).

171. Final Judgment, Ams. for Safe Access v. County of Alameda, No. RG 04-192053, at 2 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2008).
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activity logs, but also returned the devices to their manufacturer, Diebold
Election Systems. "Why the County did so is anybody's guess," the judge
declared, "[b]ut the result is absolutely certain: the information on those
machines is lost completely.' ' 72 Voters no longer had the ability to verify the
results of the election. Thus, the judge ruled that Alameda County should pay
attorneys' fees and reimburse the plaintiffs more than $22,000 for the disputed
recount costs. 173 Though election officials (as opposed to manufacturers) were

directly sanctioned here, the important point is that the specific harm suffered
by the plaintiffs was their inability to access the information necessary for
corroborating the referendum's results. Election officials as well as private
voting machine vendors lacked the incentives to keep and ensure access to the
data stored on the machines.
Instead of relying only on the statutory or constitutional remedies available
in a particular state, however, parties seeking to verify an election's results
should also be able to look at the underlying procurement contracts as a further
enforcement mechanism. While the next Part will suggest specific
considerations for designing these contracts, this Part has argued that the
procurement process has been a conceptually underdeveloped arena for
thinking about accountability in election administration- and should no longer
be. Procurement contracts can usefully be considered hybrids of traditional
public and private accountability principles insofar as they are subject to a
variety of norms such as transparency and fairness and also depend on market
competition and efficiency in the ultimate award of the contract itself.
IV. TOWARD PRINCIPLED REFORM

When officials and vendors alike refuse to allow election results to be
verified, few contractual avenues for relief are consistently available across
states. This disparity results in part from variations in procurement regimes.
Contracting localities diverge in bidding criteria, the parties designated to
upgrade technology and, most importantly, who bears the legal risks should
voting machines fail. This heterogeneity exacerbates the problem of legitimacy
externalities. Underspecified and unenforced vendor contracts make it easier
for manufacturers and officials to pass the buck when ballots disappear or
machines malfunction. A lack of public and private accountability in one

172. Order Granting Sanctions and Continuing Motions for Sanctions, Ams. for Safe Access v.
County ofAlameda, No. RG 04-192053, at 8 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2007).
173. Final Judgment, supra note 171, at 3. In addition, the judge voided the previous ballot

measure and ordered it to be returned to the ballot in November 2008. Id. 2-3.
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jurisdiction fosters nagging doubts about the results in others; voters across
the country are left to wonder whether anyone is responsible for ensuring that
their votes are properly counted. Partisanship and the perverse incentives
arising from the industry's revolving door only add to these fears.
This Part argues that an important first step toward publicly legitimate
elections requires centralized baseline standards and the development of best
practices. It accordingly proposes one narrow set of amendments to the Help
America Vote Act and enforcement measures aimed at improving the
performance of voting machines through incentive-based bargaining. These
amendments would attempt to ensure better access to vote-counting software
through mandatory procurement contract provisions, while still respecting the
need to protect business investments. Critically, these provisions should focus
on performance-, not design-based, standards that are enforced by third-party
beneficiaries. By the same token, this Part also discusses some broader
principles by which other proposals might be drafted and debated. Although
not a call for the wholesale federalization of election administration, these
targeted reforms could go far in mitigating the democratic threats presented by
unverifiable elections.
A. Amending the Help America Vote Act
HAVA was and remains a watershed piece of legislation. In addition to
committing federal funds toward new voting technology and requiring
accessibility for disabled voters, HAVA also created the Election Assistance
Commission. 7 4 In effect, the Act transferred the task of election administration
from localities to a stronger state-centered regime with still deferential federal
oversight. 17 Many aspects of the Act remain important and relevant.
Nevertheless, continuing public travails with voting technology demand
HAVA's amendment.
1. Design Versus Performance

Recent efforts to amend the Help America Vote Act usually focus on how
voting machines should be designed. The most prominent proposals, for
example, advocate some form of voter-verified paper trails, 76 which would

174. 42 U.S.C.
175.
176.

§§

15,3o1(a), (b)(i)(F), 15,321, 15,481(a)(3).

Shambon, supra note 53, at 431.
See Clifford A. Jones, Out of Guatemala?: Election Law Reform in Florida and the Legacy of
Bush v. Gore in the 2004 PresidentialElection, 5 ELECTION L.J. 121, 136 (2006) ("Although
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require attached printers to generate a contemporaneous paper record for
voters to review. 77 Design-based standards like these specify how a technology
must operate and what features it must possess.' 78 Their principal advantage is
their enforceability: after manufacturers follow strict directions for how to
build a product, an inspector can readily determine compliance. 79 The major
problem with design-based proposals, however, is that they tend to stifle
innovation -particularly under conditions of legal or technological uncertainty.
Performance standards, by contrast, set forth guidelines for the functions
that a piece of technology should be able to perform."' Instead of specifying
every feature of the machinery itself, performance standards simply identify the
kinds of outcomes the technology should be able to obtain.1

While design

standards define the method by which manufacturers are required to achieve a
stated goal, manufacturers under a performance standard are free to achieve
the enumerated goal in any way they deem most cost-efficient."2 The principal

advantage of this approach is that, in effect, it allows the market to create and
shape a product.' Through competition, manufacturers possess the incentives
to develop new software and hardware features to minimize their costs.
What HAVA currently lacks - and needs - is a provision that governs

procurement contracts between states and private manufacturers. Section 305
of the Act explicitly provides that "[t]he specific choices on the methods of
complying with the requirements of this title shall be left to the discretion of
the State."' 8 4 States are asked to draft "state plans" through which they

election reform communities initially embraced DREs for the many advantages they offer,

the last few years or so have seen a rise in concern about the lack of paper trails, specifically
voter-verified paper trails, due to perceived threats to ballot security in the form of fraud or
manipulation that some believe would be facilitated by DRE machines."); Tokaji, supra note
15, at 178o ("The flurry of attention to DRE security has caused many advocates to call for a
'voter-verified paper audit trail,' prompting bills to mandate this device in both the House
and the Senate.").
178.

See Tokaji, supra note 15, at 178o.
See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals, Instruments, and Environmental Policy
Choice, lO DUKE ENvTL. L. &POL'YF. 297, 305 (2000).

179.

See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 319, 340-41

177.

(2005).

18o. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 105 (1982); SHARON J. LASKOWSKI ET
AL., IMPROVING THE USABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF VOTING SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTS 10

(2004), http://vote.nist.gov/Final%2oHuman%2oFactors%2oReport%20%205-04.pdf.
181.

See

NEIL

GUNNINGHAM

&

PETER

GRABOSKY,

SMART

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 442 (1998).

182. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 178, at 305.
183.

Id.

184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15,485.
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demonstrate and certify HAVA compliance."s State legislatures must then pass
implementing legislation. While maintaining this orientation toward
cooperative federalism, 86 section 305 (by reference to section 301, which deals
with "voting system" requirements) 187 should be amended with a requirement
that every state procurement contract with voting machine vendors contain a
mandatory clause as a condition for federal funding. Although the precise
language would necessarily be developed through consultation with
stakeholders and experts, in substance, this narrow clause would demand that
all state procurement contracts using federal funds to purchase new voting
equipment would allow for the means to verify the votes cast. In other words,
this clause would require that the technology and software used in all voting
machines would be transparent and available for inspection after contested
elections.
However worded, this provision should be performance based, rather than
design based. It would delineate the requisite standards, not the specific form
of technology-whether open source, paper verified, and so on-that a voting
machine should meet. When procurement contract provisions are sufficiently
centered on performance, such contracts can introduce market incentives to
drive the development of accountability-enhancing design options. In effect,
they can be an effective and judicially sanctioned method of "shifting design
risk to [the contractor.]',,8 Requiring states to engage in contractual
bargaining with proposed vendors has the potential to increase competition
and innovation.
There are, of course, numerous challenges to drafting the language of this
performance-based clause and the exact wording would benefit from legislative
hearings. Because these provisions are intended to define a result -transparent

185.

Id. § 15,403(a)-(b).

186.

Cooperative federalism requires "that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with
their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 7o6, 748 (1999). In this view, though the federal government is
charged with promoting and protecting federal interests, it must do so in a way that does
not "unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the states." Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

U.S.C. § 15,841. The section defines "voting system[s]" as "the total combination of
mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware,
and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment)" used to
"define ballots," "cast and count votes," "report or display election results," and "maintain
and produce any audit trail information." Id. 15 ,481(b)(1).

187. 42

188. Laura A. Hauser & William J. Tinsley Jr., Eyes Wide Open: ContractorsMust Learn To Identify
and React to Design Risks Assumed Under Performance Specifications, CONSTRUCTION LAW.,

Summer 2007, at

32.
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and accountable vote-counting- rather than the process through which to
achieve that result, the clause must identify a narrow, verifiable goal without
needlessly constraining the contractor's ability to meet that goal. 8 9 The clause
should emphasize that its purpose is to provide as much design flexibility and
responsibility to the contractor as possible. But again, these specifications
cannot be drafted in isolation, but only after consultation with stakeholders
who could provide more information about budgeting concerns and costs.
Procurement officers should conduct design surveys to ensure that the
specifications are sufficiently well defined to enable the contractor to submit a
bid for the work that will likely result in the desired end product.
This kind of proposal is not unprecedented. The Environmental Protection
Agency, for example, mandates the inclusion of particular clauses in all
construction contracts awarded to a grantee.1 9 ° These include "a changes
clause, a differing site conditions clause, a suspension of work clause, a
termination for default clause, a termination for convenience clause, a right to
audit clause and a clause providing for a price reduction for defective cost or
' More specifically, the required contractual language expressly
pricing data."191
states that "[t]he owner and the contractor agree that the following
supplemental general provisions apply to the work to be performed under this
contract and that these provisions supersede any conflicting provisions of this
contract." 192 In this manner, voting machine contracts-like the EPA's
construction contracts- should contain off-the-rack provisions that would
trump competing efforts to contract around them.
Certainly, a straight statutory mandate by itself could also spur state
legislatures to require vendors to allow access to their vote-counting software.
However, political entities including state legislatures often lack the political
will or resources to adequately protect the interests of voters and candidates.
To illustrate, the North Carolina State Board of Elections was charged by
statute to procure voting machines only when it could have access to their
software, which would be placed in escrow.' 93 In late 2005, however, a
potential vendor, Diebold, invoked its commercial property rights and brought
a declaratory judgment action against the state, arguing that it could not

i89. Id. at 36.
19o. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 35.938-8

(2008); Baker, supra note 157,

at

285.

191. Baker, supra note 157, at 285.
192.

40 C.F.R. Pt. 35, subpt. E, app. C-2(1)(a) (2008).

193. Act of Aug. 26,

2005,

ch.

323,

sec. 2(a),

§§

163-165.9A(a)(I), 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1156, 1161.
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supply the required information.'9 4 Diebold explained that its software
constituted a trade secret, and thus did not have to be divulged.' 5 After
Diebold refused to comply with the law, the Board of Elections, in effect,
nullified the statute and proceeded to approve Diebold as a vendor on the
tenuous grounds that none of the other bidders could comply with the
statutory requirement.' 96 Its contract included no requirement to disclose
software. A court challenge to that decision was unsuccessful, 97 and ultimately
the only fact that prevented the use of Diebold's machines in North Carolina
was Diebold's independent decision to withdraw from the state.198
As this example illustrates, election officials have various incentives whether born of expediency or the revolving door -that counsel against the
unfettered delegation of technology purchasing decisions. Rather, federal
funds should be conditioned on a performance-based clause in procurement
contracts, whereby suppliers compete for bids through processes that
emphasize norms like transparency and fairness. By contrast, simply requiring
software disclosure without subjecting it to the procurement process could
mean that the requirement would be grafted on after a vendor has already been
chosen. Election officials could simply nullify the statute when forced to deal
bilaterally with a foregone manufacturer.
Congress could enact such a measure under its various powers, most
importantly those granted under the Election199 and Spending"' Clauses.
Consistent with this authority, courts have interpreted Congress's power
pursuant to the Elections Clause broadly in upholding legislation like the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993.20° Under the Spending Clause,

194. See Complaint at 6-8, lo, Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. o5CVS-1 5474 (N.C. Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/Activisi/Evoting/diebold complaint.pdf.
195.

Id.

196.

See Anne Broache, North Carolina Defends E-Voting Certifications, CNETNEWS.coM, Dec. 2,
http ://news.com.con/North+Carolina+defends+e-voting+certifications/21oo2005,
10283- 5 980671.html.
See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Litigation, http://www.eff.org/ActivisnVE-voting/ (last

197.

visited Dec. 5, 2008).
198.

199.

Diebold's rival vendor Election Systems & Software eventually agreed to comply with the
state's law. See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., After EFF Litigation, Diebold Pulls Out
of North Carolina (Dec. 23, 2005), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2005/12/23.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

2oo. Id. § 8, cl. 1.
aol. E.g., Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir. 1997);
Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F. 3 d 791, 798 ( 7 th Cit. 1995); Voting
Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F. 3 d 1411, 1414 (9th Cit. 1995).
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conditional grants like HAVA merely create incentives rather than coercive
pronouncements for states and thus do not constitute unconstitutional
intrusions into state sovereignty.2"2 A conditional spending statute is
constitutionally permissible since states retain the formal choice either to enact
the federal conditions or to refuse the federal funding altogether." 3 For
example, Congress has conditioned states' receipt of federal highway funds on
the enactment of laws requiring the use of seatbelts,20 4 as well as raising the
drinking age to twenty-one years.2 " The Clean Air Act requires states to
participate in cleaning up air pollution,2, 6 while the Rehabilitation Act requires
federally funded programs to build facilities that accommodate persons with
disabilities. 0 7 A host of federal statutes similarly require recipients of federal
grants to comply with environmental or safety standards in state procurement
and construction contracts.2"8
2.

ContractingOut of Trade Secrets

Given Congress's power, procurement contracts offer an opportunity to
shape the incentives of election officials up front, in ways that may stave off
costly post-election litigation. Election officials, knowing they could face
litigation under the contract, have a greater motivation to draft the contract
such that candidates and voters will have greater access ex ante to underlying

202.
203.

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). In exercising this power, courts
have also held that Congress would have to comply with four limitations: (i) the spending
must be in pursuit of the general welfare, (2) the condition imposed on the receipt of federal
funds must be stated unambiguously so that a state accepting the federal funds is aware of
the consequence of that acceptance, (3) the condition on the funds must be related to the
federal interest for which the money is being spent, and (4) there must be no other
independent constitutional bar. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.

204. Federal Aid Highway Act, 23
205.

Id. § 158.

206.

42

U.S.C.

207. 29 U.S.C.

§

U.S.C. §

153 (2000).

7410.

§§ 701-796.

2o8. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REv. 913, 968 n.216 (2007) ("The U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) has taken an initial step in this direction for the automotive sector
by forming a partnership with automobile original equipment manufacturers and their
suppliers to encourage the adoption of supplier requirements."); Suppliers Partnership for
the Environment, http://www.supplierspartnership.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2008). The EPA
also has identified private supply-chain contracting requirements as a possible means of
reducing the environmental risks posed by nanotechnology. See Nanoscale Materials, Notice
of Public Meeting, 70 Fed. Reg. 24,574 (May 10, 2005).
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software and hardware. Indeed, successful election administration demands
the means for voters or candidates to examine the data and technology that
record and count votes. These technological features serve important
reassurance functions. Because HAVA spurred jurisdictions to purchase
equipment with little oversight and an expedited timetable, many of them were
left with little bargaining power to exact concessions from vendors. As a result,
the current regime provides few, if any, avenues of recourse against private
manufacturers, who invoke the doctrine of trade secrecy in refusing to divulge
their software source code to those contesting election results.
A trade secret is defined as any privileged information used in business that
gives one a competitive market advantage. 20 9 The trade secrets doctrine allows
businesses to keep commercially valuable information secret for a potentially
unlimited amount of time, as a means of concealing their software code and
manufacturing processes from competitors." l Consequently, voters and
candidates have few legal options for forcing disclosure. Take, for example, a
recent November 2006 ruling by a Florida appellate court holding that
congressional candidate Christine Jennings could not have access to the
software that counted votes during her disputed contest for Florida's thirteenth
district.21 ' During the election, irregularly high undervote rates on the
iVotronic machines used in Sarasota County drew national attention." 2
Undervotes occur when voters fail to select any candidate on the ballot. ' 3
While absentee ballots in Sarasota County reflected a typical congressional
undervote rate of around two percent, the iVotronic s reflected an undervote
rate of over sixteen percent. 1 4 Although the reason for the anomaly is unclear perhaps more people simply declined to mark a candidate -without access to

209. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757 cmt. b

(1939)

("A trade secret may consist of any formula,

pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it.").
210. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure,
59 FLA. L. REv. 135 (2007).
211.

Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, No. 1Do7-ooll (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 18,
2007) (order denying petition for certiorari), available at http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/

FloridaFolder/opinionooi.pdf; see also Warren Stewart, Florida Court Rules in Favor of
ES&S Trade Secret Protection, VOTETRuSTUSA, June 19, 2007, http://votetrustusa.org/
index.php ?option=com content&task=view&id=2498&Itemid= 113.
212. Bob Mahlburg & Maurice Tamman, Dist. 13 Voting Analysis Shows Broad Problem, HERALDTRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.), Nov. 9, 20o6 at 1A.
213. See Laurin Frisina et al., Ballot Formats, Touchscreens, and Undervotes: A Study of the 2oo6
Midterm Elections in Florida,7 ELECTION L.J. 25, 26 (2008).
214. See Stewart, supra note 211.
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the software source code, it was difficult to evaluate, let alone rule out, the role
that malfunctioning software may have played." ' Nevertheless, the judge
decided that it was more important to protect trade secrets than to determine
the cause of over eighteen thousand undervotes. 6
In confronting this tension between vendors' intellectual property rights
and the demand for accountability, well-designed procurement contracts can
help strike a careful balance. When manufacturers submit their bids, they
could choose from a variety of options, including source code escrow
requirements, independent code reviews, mandatory disclosure of source code,
and required use of open source code."' Each option differently balances the
various commercial, democratic, and performance interests at stake.
While source code escrow requirements and independent code review
center on the actors entitled to see the software, disclosed and open source
software requirements focus on the underlying technology. More specifically,
source code escrow involves placing the programming code for the voting
system with a third party and specifying under what conditions the code may
be released.1 8 When there is an independent code review requirement, by
contrast, state election officials may ask an independent party to inspect the
source code in addition to review at the federal certification level.219
In turn, required disclosure of source code requirements allows only for its
limited use, usually for evaluation purposes, without permission to make
further copies, modify the work, or distribute it.22 In contrast, open-source
software is software that is commonly programmed by volunteers and released
under generous licensing provisions that allow users to exercise a number of
rights such as copying, modification and distribution.2 ' The main benefit of
disclosed code is that it allows enhanced access while still retaining many of the
proprietary features that preserve monetary incentives for software designers.
Open-source software, on the other hand, allows direct access to the source
code. Anyone who accepts the terms of the open-source license will have the

215.

Id.

Vi6. Id.
211.

Hall, supra note 99, at i.

218.

Id. at 1 n.2.

21g. Id. at i n.3.
220. Id. at 1 n.5.
221.

Id.
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freedom to examine the code; as a result, the legitimacy of the code might
increase even as the potential for profit declines.22
At the same time, disclosed code does not allow the robust testing that
open-source code promotes due to restraints in the making of derivative works
key to certain forms of open-source testing. In addition, there are common
risks associated with both means of providing software access. Since computer
scientists have yet to find a method for writing bug-free software, public
disclosure of the system source code will inevitably result in the disclosure of
vulnerabilities to would-be hackers seeking to alter election results. 3 Those
tasked with defending voting systems - usually local election staff- are often
poorly trained to identify serious code-level vulnerabilities.
Despite these disadvantages, all of the strategies guarantee limited
contractual overrides of a manufacturer's attempts to completely shield access
to software through the trade secrets doctrine. Procurement contracts would
encourage competition among vendors pursuant to a mandated clause
requiring access to the means with which to verify election results and
vote-counting software. Parties will therefore be more likely to negotiate a
balance between the interests protected as trade secrets and voters' demands
for accountability. Put differently, the incentives of vendors and procurement
officers during the procurement process-to minimize costs and secure the
contract by designing better functioning and more secure technology-have
the potential to foster bargaining resulting in agreements for tailored software
disclosures, say, only in the event of a litigation challenge by candidates in close
races.
Although some might argue that the end of robust trade secrecy in software
source code would dissipate the already small profit margins," 4 such objections
overstate their case. Cutting back on trade secret protection could lower
barriers to entry, thus making the industry more palatable for smaller firms,
which would, in turn, create economic pressure for more research and
development. In addition, commercial incentives would still encourage market
competition for profit. By removing the role of copyright and trade secrecy, for

222. See, e.g., Deirdre K. Mulligan & Joseph Lorenzo Hall, A Ctr. for Correct, Usable, Reliable,

Auditable, Transparent Elections (ACCURATE), Open Source Software-Does It Have a

available at
8, 20o6),
(Feb.
System?
Electoral
California's
Place in
http://josephhall.org/papers/JHall-DMulligan-testimony-CASenate-2oo6o2o8.pdf
(representing prepared testimony before the California Senate Elections, Reapportionment
and Constitutional Amendments Committee).
223. See Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About
Computer and Network Security?, 3J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163 (2004).
224. See Hall, supra note 99, at 9.
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example, open source software regimes allow a vendor's competitors to modify
their code and compete; at the same time, however, qualitatively
better-designed or more secure software could still be sold on the market, and
would benefit from the increased testing and public oversight. Disclosed source
code regimes, on the other hand, provide vendors more flexibility to protect
the intellectual property interests than standard open source licenses. With
disclosed source provisions, intellectual property claims would become less of
an issue, since such claims would turn substantially on the agreed-upon
disclosed source license. In this manner, the market and technological tradeoffs
between various kinds of software and disclosure agreements require more
sophisticated thinking that would be facilitated by well-designed performance
provisions refined through the competitive, procurement process.
The proposal here would differ from recent legislative bills like H.R. 811 as
it would allow for more market-based bargaining relative to a static legislative
bargain. Entitled the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of
2007," and often referred to as the "Holt Election Reform Bill" after its
sponsor, H.R. 811 originally proposed that
[n]o voting system used in an election for Federal office shall at any
time contain or use any software not certified by the State for use in
the election or any software undisclosed to the State in the certification
process. The appropriate election official shall disclose . . . and the
Commission shall make... source code, object code, executable

representation, and ballot programming files available for inspection
promptly upon request to any person.22
Reflecting the bipartisan momentum for reform, the bill had 216 cosponsors in
the House (only 218 are needed to pass). Because Congress failed to take any
action on the bill after May 2007, it will need to be reintroduced, if at all, in a
future next session.
H.R. 811 was amended and reported out by the House Administration
Committee with a requirement that election software be released to "qualified
persons" who sign nondisclosure agreements protecting intellectual property
rights and trade secrets.,, 6 "Qjualified persons" included governmental entities
responsible for reviewing the software, in addition to parties to pre-election

225.

See Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, H.R. 811, lloth Cong. § 9
(2007).

226. Voter Confidence and

Increased Accountability Act of

2007, H. Rep. No. 11o-154, at 4, 35

(2007).
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and post-election challenges.227 In effect, the amendment reversed the intent of
the original software disclosure provisions which explicitly declared voting
system software a trade secret and prohibited any public disclosure, although it
did allow for litigating parties to examine the code. Importantly, the definition
excluded
explicitly
software"
"election-dedicated
of
voting
many
that
Given
"commercial-off-the-shelf-software" (COTS).228
machine manufacturers rely heavily on commercial-off-the-shelf software (like
Microsoft Windows) for their voting machines, the new amendment suggested
that very little of the manufacturer's intellectual property would be protected in
escrow. 22 1 As a 2003 Congressional Research Service report notes, the "way
COTS software is tested and used in current DREs might itself create
vulnerabilities." 231 In this manner, provisions like those that were at issue in
H.R. 811 are subject to continuous legislative amendment as interest groups
and lobbyists whittle away at various design features. Performance-based
features refined through the procurement process, on the other hand, would
allow for more technological innovation and foster competition to provide
software options with more accessibility and thus greater accountability at the
state and local levels.
Needless to say, then, for electronic voting machines, a wide range of
options remains on the table in terms of how to meet the various needs of
voters while promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of elections. As this
technology continues to develop, issues surrounding software and the internal
infrastructure of voting machines will inevitably take central stage as it did in
Florida's thirteenth congressional district, and Christine Jennings's attempt to
contest those results. 23' Under the amendments to HAVA proposed here, state
or local governments promulgating their procurement requests would have a
host of design options at their disposal, which would comply with the mandate
to contract for access to underlying source code. In their RFPs, for example,
state and local governments could demand the limited ownership of
intellectual property and the circumstances under which parties would have
access to it. 32 These procurement requests would specify the conditions under

227.

Id.

228.

Id.

229. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ELECTION REFORM AND ELECTRONIC VOTING
SYSTEMS (DREs): ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ISSUES 26 (2003), available at http://

www.epic.org/privacy/voting/crsreport.pdf.
230.

Id. at 26

231.

For discussion of the litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 211-216.

232.

This approach has also been recommended by the National Association of State
Procurement Officials and National Association of State Chief Information Officers. See

n.io2.
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which bidders would have to provide the means with which to verify how their
software functioned.
B. Enforcing HA VA

In addition to encouraging experimentation in balancing the interests of
both parties to the contract, performance-based procurement provisions could
provide more remedies relative to more command-and-control statutory
measures -provided that meaningful enforcement measures are in place.
Because procurement contracts can be flexibly designed, parties can agree to
any combination of sanctions upon breach. As such, the proposed amendment
to the Help America Vote Act should also explicitly recognize electoral
candidates as third-party beneficiaries to enforce the procurement
provisions.23 3 Doing so would provide a genuinely meaningful accountability
tool that not only requires voting machine manufacturers to provide an account
of machine performance, but also sanctions manufacturers based on a failure to
provide such an account.
Under the reigning HAVA regime, if state and local authorities fail to
comply with voting systems standards, the U.S. Attorney General can bring a
civil action against the state or local jurisdiction in federal district court for
declaratory and injunctive relief.2 34 In addition, states receiving federal funds
under HAVA must establish administrative complaint procedures that can be
used by those who believe there has been a violation of Title III.235 In practice,
however, the federal government often underenforces conditions placed on

NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS & NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE CHIEF INFO.
OFFICERS, NEGOTIATING IP ON THE WAY TO THE WIN-WIN: NASCIO's INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RECOMMENDATIONS
4
(2005),
available
at

http://www.naspo.org/old-site/whitepapers/NASPONASCIOResearchBriefo3o2os.pdf.
233. Voters are another potential class of third-party beneficiaries. Though an explicit statutory

grant of standing to voters may raise standing doctrine concerns stemming from harms that
are too "generalized," see, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989), there are
important policy reasons why a narrower class, like candidates, would be better equipped to
bring the claims. First, candidates have ample incentives to redress the harms arising from a
failure to enforce the performance provisions of state procurement contracts-particularly
when they are on the losing end of a closely contested election. Because the pressure to
concede mounts quickly, the claims would be brought in a timely manner. Second, if voters
were enabled to bring suits, they would be well positioned to extort gains or promises from
the declared electoral victor in exchange for an agreement not to bring suit. As such,
narrowly defining the class of third-party beneficiaries to candidates is prudentially sound.
234.

42 U.S.C. § 15,511 (Supp. V. 2005).

235. Id. § 15,512.
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federal grants.236 Federal agencies' desires to preserve positive relationships
with state administrators coupled with a simple lack of monitoring resources
contribute to this phenomenon.2 37 For the accountability benefits secured
under conditional grants to be meaningful, however, they must be enforceable.
Over the years, litigants have advanced several theories to accomplish this end
for different statutes, including the finding of an implied private right of
action, the application of § 1983, and third-party beneficiary theory.23 8 Because
the courts have significantly limited recovery under implied private right of
action and § 1983 theories, more straightforward contractual claims by third
39
parties provide the most promising grounds for robust enforcement.
Therefore, HAVA should also be amended to grant explicit recognition of
third-party beneficiaries to enforce the provisions of state procurement
contracts. While voters would naturally be one potential class of beneficiaries,
electoral candidates would be the best positioned to engage in such
enforcement. Not only could candidates adequately serve as representatives for
voter interests when bringing suit, but allowing voters to enforce the statute
would potentially create crowded dockets requiring quick resolution, as well as
extortion incentives as winning candidates would be asked to buy off voters
threatening costly litigation. Candidates would be able to sue for specific
performance and injunctive relief, and thus gain access to inspect voting
machines' underlying source code and records.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged that Congress can enact
legislation under its Spending Clause powers by placing conditions on the
grant of federal finds'~ Such legislation is "in the nature of a contract"
because "in return for federal funds the [recipients] agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions."" 4 Under this contract analogy, the Court has

236.

See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of FederalLaw To Free State and Local
Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201, 1248 (1999) ("[F]ederal
agencies may likely underenforce federal grant conditions relating to local autonomy, either
because they lack the resources to monitor state compliance or because they wish to preserve
their resources for other battles deemed more important to the success of the program.").

238.

Id.
An implied private right of action is characterized as the idea that a court may "find"
legislative intent to permit an individual to enforce a federal statute in the absence of express
language to that effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

239.

See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003); Blessing v.

237.

Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
240.

See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002) (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999)); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274
(1998); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

241.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
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found that Congress must unambiguously state each of the conditions that it
has placed on the grant of federal monies. 42 Just as a valid contract requires
offer and acceptance of its terms, "[t]he legitimacy of Congress'[s] power to
legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the [recipient]
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' . .. Accordingly,

if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal monies, it
must do so unambiguously." 3 Under these explicit provisions, a recipient of
federal grants "may be held liable to third-party beneficiaries for intentional
conduct that violates the clear terms of the relevant statute." 4 At the same
time, recipients would not be held liable to third-party beneficiaries for a
"failure to comply with vague language describing the objectives of the
statute," so Congress must be especially clear in specifying the relevant
statutory provisions. 4
Third-party beneficiaries to a contract are those intended by the drafters to
benefit from the contract itself. 46 Given that HAVA is a conditional federal
funding program, Congress can explicitly designate candidates as third-party
beneficiaries of its contract-like relationship with state bodies who accept the
funding and, in doing so, authorize and accord standing to candidates who
would be able to bring suit to enforce the contractual conditions. 4 7 Although

242.
243.
244.
245246.

247.

Id.
Id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 640; Gebser, 524 U.S.
Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).

at 287.

Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979). The Second Restatement's
formulation provides that a party is an intended beneficiary, and thus has rights under a
contract, if
unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee ... recognition of a
right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention
of the parties and either: (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance.
Id.
Standing requires a plaintiff to allege he has suffered a concrete injury, see Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), traceable to the defendant's action, see
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976), that can be effectively
redressed by the court, id at 38, 43. Applying this test, candidates surely suffer a concrete
injury - deprivation of office- as the result of faulty voting machine software. Such defects
would be directly assignable to the manufacturer's actions, and injunctive remedies would
be readily available in court. More importantly, when Congress explicitly designates who
can bring suit to enforce its actions, courts are likely to find standing as long as
particularized injuries are identifiable. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 352-
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the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the precise issue of whether state
or federal law should govern, a growing body of case law in the lower courts
suggests that state law would determine the available causes of action for
enforcing the related, but distinct contractual relationship between state bodies
and manufacturers. For example, in Brogdon ex rel. Cline v. National Healthcare
Corp. 48 "residents of a long-term health care facility sued its owners for failing
to provide basic, and required, care.''49 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants had breached the contract between the health care facility and
the Georgia Department of Community Health pursuant to Medicaid and
Medicare legislation."'
In holding that state law governed the contract at issue, the court examined
the legislative history of Medicaid and Medicare statutes and determined that
Congress had not intended to create a private cause of action.5 1 Moreover, it
relied on Miree v. DeKalb County,2 2 in which the Supreme Court held that
whether the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries was a matter of state, not
federal, law. Miree, however, did not implicate Congress's spending power, nor
its ability to directly designate the intended beneficiaries of its legislation. Miree
involved victims of an airline crash who brought a diversity action against the
owner of an airport on the grounds that they were third-party beneficiaries of a
contract between the airport and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
which obligated the airport to take certain precautions.2 53 Given no indication
that Congress intended to displace state law,2 4 and because the case involved
"federal interest[s] only insofar as such lawsuits might be thought to advance
2
federal aviation policy by inducing compliance with FAA safety provisions," 2
the Supreme Court held that the contract should be evaluated under state
6

law.25

53 (1984); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 103 (2007)
("When Congress passes a statute, it may specify who is entitled to bring suit under that
statute.... However, Congress can always choose to be more specific; it may limit the set of
plaintiffs who may challenge governmental action.").

F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga.
249. Id. at 1324-25.
248. 103

250.

Id. at

2000).

1325.

251. Id. at 1330.
252. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).

253.

Id. at 27.

254.

Id. at 32.

255.

Id.

256.

Id. at 32-33.

HeinOnline -- 118 Yale L. J. 791 2008-2009

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

118:744

2009

Thus, while it is possible that a reviewing court would apply a similar
analysis to a procurement contract adopted pursuant to HAVA, should
Congress explicitly recognize the federal interests in ensuring election integrity
as well as an intention to displace state law in crafting a robust enforcement
scheme, the legislative scheme would likely preempt state law. Even if a court
decided to apply state law in enforcing the contract, the explicit designation of
third-party beneficiaries in the contract itself would render it likely that
candidates would still be able to enforce the contract under traditional state
contract law principles. Given these precedents as well as the settled
recognition that the federal government has broad discretion to determine the
proper remedy for enforcing conditions on federal spending, Congress should
explicitly provide third-party beneficiaries with standing to enforce the terms
of HAVA, even if cabined only to the amendment proposed here. In doing so,
Congress would create a meaningful sanction for holding voting machine
manufacturers to account when they fail to provide access to the technological
means by which election results can be verified. This enforcement mechanism
would not only help meet the demand for accountability, but also vindicate the
larger democratic promise underlying HAVA itself.
CONCLUSION

America's existing system of oversight and decisionmaking in the purchase
of voting machines is heterogeneous, partisan, and underfunded.5 7 Together,
these features result in few levers of accountability and overt incentives to
subvert the ones that exist. Not surprisingly, precarious dips in voter
confidence threaten to undermine the legitimacy of elections as a whole. Costs
borne by local governments eager, but constrained, in their ability to upgrade
their voting technology increase the incentives for election officials to
participate in the revolving door between election administration and the
voting machine industry. Technological breakdowns on Election Day further
contribute to unmet demands for accountability, weakened by an emaciated
system of statutory and regulatory oversight. Proprietary restrictions on
software code as well as nontransparent testing and certification procedures
shroud much of the process in secrecy.
A federal approach to the procurement of voting machines would help to
ensure accountability and value for state governments, as well as potentially

257.

See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term -Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof
Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 28, 82 (2004) (declaring that a "partisan and
decentralized" system "is a peculiarly American means to resolve disputed elections").
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increase long-term profits for contractors. It would also reduce incentives for
vendors to forum shop by providing services to states with the weakest
standards or lacking the political will to enforce them. Thus, as a condition of
federal grants, Congress should tailor privatization experiments to extend
public interests not only to the state and local government grantees that
directly receive the funds, but also to the private contractors with whom they
contract. To accomplish this, Congress must provide meaningful enforcement
mechanisms with which to do so.
Two challenges face our electoral system: spurring technological
innovation and safeguarding values like accuracy and transparency." 8 Insofar
as elections serve a fundamental democratic function, the importance of
ensuring their legitimacy is at a zenith. Toward these ends, well-designed
procurement contracts can provide an important means of extending public
interest priorities on behalf of voters to private actors, and of exacting
compromises and gains through bargaining that might otherwise reside
beyond the federal government's regulatory reach.

258. Tokaji, supra note 15, at 1796.
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